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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah
Code.
II.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue: Did the district court correctly hold that the City had no duty to provide

different or additional warning devices at the crossing?
B.

Issue: Is the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the

City proper because the City is immune under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act?
C.

Issue: Is the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the

City proper because plaintiffs failed to establish any causal comiection between the claimed
improper signing and the accident?
Standard of Review: Summary judgment presents questions of law and is reviewed
for correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994).
D.

Issue: Did the district court properly strike the affidavit of Archie Burnham?

Standard of Review: The district court found that the Affidavit of Mr. Burnham was
irrelevant and inadmissible; presumably, unlielpful to the court. To the extent that the
court's ruling on the affidavit dealt with the admissibility of expert testimony, the standard
of review is abuse of discretion, Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999).
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Preservation of Issues: The issue of the lower court's granting summary judgment
was preserved in the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, and various memoranda filed
in support and in opposition thereto, and the district court's Memorandum Decision and
Order Granting the City's Motion (R. 1258), and Judgment of Dismissal of the City
(R. 1310).
The district court's granting of the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Mr. Burnham was
preserved in the City's Motion to Strike the Affidavit, the various memoranda filed in
support and in opposition thereto, and by the Order Granting the Motion to Strike Affidavits
(R. 1307).
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in District Court
The appellants are the parents of three teenagers who were killed when Brent

Laixabee drove in front of an Amtrak passenger train at a crossing in the City of South Jordan
on New Year's Eve, 1995.
The Larrabee vehicle was the second vehicle in a three-car caravan. The other two
vehicles were occupied by teenage friends of the decedents, and they were all on their way
to a New Year's Eve party. As they approached the railroad crossing they passed several
warning signs, and at the crossing itself were a stop sign and a railroad crossing "crossbuck."
At Addendum A is a diagram of the area (not to scale) depicting, generally, the
relative locations of roads, tracks, signs, and the order of the cars in the caravan and who
occupied each vehicle.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The first car in the caravan, driven by Jacque Zimmerman, stopped at the crossing.
She drove across the tracks when the train was so close that its headlight lit up the right side
of her car. Larrabee was right behind. He pulled up, stopped, and then pulled out in front
of the train, and was struck. The occupants of the third vehicle watched the accident occur
in front of them.

Several occupants in the third vehicle saw and heard the train well in

advance of the accident. The drivers and occupants in the first and third vehicles testified
that they knew there was a crossing, they could see the stop sign and crossbuck, and
accordingly, they stopped.
The parents claim that the City should be liable because there was some deficiency
widi the existing signs, that additional unspecified signs should have been installed, that the
City should have installed active1 devices (train-activated lights and gates), or closed the
road.
After discoveiy, the City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that
the City was immune, had no duty to install any particular type of sign, and that plaintiffs
had not established causation.
In response to the City's Motion, appellants filed the affidavit of Archie Burnham.
Defendants moved to strike the affidavit because it was vague, conclusory, speculative,
unsupported by any specific facts, and failed to meet the requirements of Rule 56(e),
U.R.C.P.

lu

Active devices" are train-activated lights/gates which tell a driver that a train is
in or near the crossing. "Passive devices," which were in place, tell a driver that there
is a crossing, and the driver is to then stop and yield to trains.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After briefing and hearing, The Honorable Anne Stirba granted the City's motions,
and Judgment of Dismissal was signed on May 2, 1999 (R. 1310), and an Order signed
striking the affidavit of Archie Burnham on May 28, 1999 (R. 1307). This appeal followed.
Tlie City specifically disagrees with two assertions made initially by appellants in the
"Nature of the Case" section of their brief at page 4, and repeated multiple times in their
brief. One statement is simply false, and the other is sheer speculation.
The false statement is that the warning devices at the crossing "consisted of old and
faded pavement markings, a partially obscured crossbuck sign, and a stop sign," implying
that the signs were not visible. However, it is undisputed that all signs were present and
visible on tlie night of tlie accident. While the pavement markings were not brand new, they
were visible. Photographs of the scene (Addenda B and C) disprove appellants' claim that
the crossing was inadequately signed.
Tlie speculative statement is that Brent Larrabee drove out in front of the train because
"he was unaware of the approaching train . . . ." How Brent Larrabee could have been
unaware of the train is puzzling, since the train headlight lit up the right side of the
Zimmerman vehicle as it went over the tracks right in front of him, and the train was also
being watched, and heard, by the occupants of the third vehicle. Nevertheless, no one knows
whether Brent Larrabee looked and did not see the train, saw it and thought he could beat it,
saw it and misjudged its speed and/or distance, did not look at all, or simply blindly followed
the Zimmerman car; to claim otherwise is mere conjecture. What is known for sure is that
he was faced with a stop sign and railroad crossbuck, and came to a complete stop at a
ninety-degree angle to the track before pulling in front of the train.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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IV. APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City agrees, partially, with the appellants' Statement of Facts. The City will set
forth those facts with which it agrees, those with which it disagrees, and those additional
facts the City believes are needed for resolution of this appeal.
"The Collision." The City does not take issue with the facts set forth in paragraphs
1 through 6 in the "The Collision" section of appellants' Statement of Facts, except in
paragraph 6, where appellants speculate that Brent Larrabee "[apparently not seeing the
approaching train . . . began across the tracks."
"The Train Crew's Actions." The City does not take issue with paragraphs 7
through 10 in the "The Train Crew's Actions" section of appellants' Statement of Facts.
"The Ultra-Hazardous Condition at the Crossing." The City takes issue with
paragraphs 11 through 13 of the "The Ultra-Hazardous Condition at the Crossing" section
of appellants' Statement of Facts, in the following particulars:
In paragraph 11, appellants state that the district court assumed in its Memorandum
Decision that the crossing was ultra hazardous, as if that were some sort of finding.
However, a review of the court's Decision makes it clear that the court was simply reciting
an assumption to that effect by die railroads, not the City. The railroads' argument was that
whether the crossing was ultra hazardous or not, they had no legal duty and they simply
assumed, for the purpose of ilieir motions, tha' the crossing was ultra hazardous.
In paragraph 12, appellants set forth evidence which they claim supports their notion
that the crossing was ultra hazardous. Most of their "evidence," however, consists of the
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unsubstantiated, conclusory statements of Mr. Burnham, and is proven false by the
photographs of the signs, hi paragraph 12(b) of plaintiffs' Statement of Facts they claim that
the configuration of the crossing is such that a driver's visibility of northbound trains is
highly restricted, and that the trains overtake northbound vehicles from behind and at an
awkward angle; however, it is clear that the road turns and crosses the tracks at a ninetydegree angle, which is proven by the photographs of the crossing. There is no citation for
the proposition that visibility problems are compounded because the track is elevated, and
the photographs prove the contrary.
Paragraph 12(c) is fiction: that the stop sign and crossbuck were not visible, the
warning signs were not properly reflectorized, and the stop ahead sign was improperly
located. The sole citation to the record is to the Affidavit of Archie Burnham, which does
not support the notion that the signs were "not properly reflectorized," or that the stop ahead
sign was improperly located.
In paragraph 13, appellants cite yet more "evidence" for the ultra-hazardous nature
of the crossing. As to the accident occurring some sixty years ago, there is no evidence that
the circumstances were substantially similar to the facts of the instant accident. The more
recent accident history indicates only that there were seven incidents at the crossing over a
fifteen-year period; however, there is no foundation in Mr. Burnham's affidavit to support
the notion that the accidentfrequencywas greater than what would normally be expected.
The UDOT Design Study Report prepared in 1984 (R. 1412, Ex. 17) did not even determine
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a hazard index for the crossing, which the UDOT would calculate in order to prioritize funds
to pay for crossing improvements.2
"Failure to Upgrade the Crossings Warning Devices," Paragraph 15 relies on the
Burnham Affidavit, and is proven false by the photographs.
Paragraph 16 is partially true. At times it has been recognized that it would be
preferable to install active warnings at the crossing. What appellants fail to acknowledge,
however, is that by 1992 it was agreed that the crossing would not be upgraded with active
crossing devices, but rather, additional signs would be placed, and that after the grade
separation was completed at 10600 South and a new frontage road built, the crossing at
10200 would be closed. See Affidavit of Gordon Haight (R. 179-184), and exhibits thereto,
including results of a surveillance review (R. 185-186), letter from UDOT to South Jordan
confirming that South Jordan would install advance warning signs and pavement markings
in 1992 (and not active devices) (R. 190, Addendum D), and the Agenda and Raihoad Status
Report (R. 192-194, Addendum D) prepared by the UDOT in October 1995, setting forth the
status of the railroad crossing as of the date of the accident:
The I-15/Railroad Study is complete. An overpass will be placed at 10600
South. When the new railroad grade and the 10600 South overpass is
2

See also, UDOT's letter to all cities and counties dated September 7, 1993 (R.
1412, Ex. 29). In part, the letter states:
UDOT only receives enough federal fimds for the upgrading of about five
crossings a year [out of 1,300+ public crossings]. At that rate, it would
take over 200 years to upgrade all of the existing public crossings. The
railroad crossings that are upgraded with federal funds are determined by the
use of a "high accident prediction formula." UDOT cannot randomly select
any crossing desired by special interest groups.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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complete, an at-grade crossing will be placed at about 10400 or 10500 South,
and the 10200 South crossing will be closed. Until then, this project is on
hold.
Paragraph 17 purports to set forth the chronology of events leading to the collision.
The City takes issue with several assertions therein.
Paragraph 17(a) states that the UDOT "recommends" to the City that active warning
devices be installed. Actually, the referenced document merely sets forth two possible
alternatives: installing automatic gates, or closing the crossing and providing an access road
at 10000 South, which would not have gates or flashing lights. Hardly a "recommendation."
(R. 949-951).
Paragraph 17(b) states that the City agrees to the UDOT's recommendations. The
reference to the record, however, refers only to an Agenda and Minutes of the City Planning
Commission, which apparently voted to recommend to the City Council that flashing lights
be installed, but that gates were not necessaiy (R. 955). However, there is no evidence that
the City Council ever adopted the recommendation of the Planning Commission or the
"recommendation" of the UDOT.
Subparagraphs (c) through (k) refer to correspondence and documents which establish
only that the crossing had received attention from the Utah Department of Transportation,
South Jordan City, the Federal Highway Administration, and the railroads. It is true that
there had been discussions about realigning the crossing, installing active warning devices,
or even closing the crossing. What the appellants fail to point out, however, is that by 1992
the idea of installing lights and gates had been abandoned. The letter from the City
Administrator to the UDOT dated July 28, 1992, summarizes the situation as it existed from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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then to the date of the accident: the City intends to eventually vacate the crossing. A new
frontage road will be built in phases over the next five years (through 1997). An underpass
will be constructed at 10600 South. The City intends to vacate 10200 South, is considering
a new crossing at 10500 South, and understands that the City will need to pay for some of
the cost of the new crossing. In the meantime, the City has "completed the additional
signage and warnings at the crossing to temporarily help the situation." (R. 1412, Ex. 7;
R. 987-988, Addendum D). That was also the status of the crossing as of the time of the
accident (R. 192-194).
Paragraph 17(1) purports to be a summary of the letter referred to in the foregoing
paragraph.

Plaintiffs misstate the facts, however, claiming that the letter was an

acknowledgment for the need for additional warning signs. In fact, the letter confirms that
the additional signs previously recommended by the UDOT had already been installed.
Paragraph 17(m) refers to a letter from the UDOT to the City in October 1992. The
UDOT is not "pleading" with the City to install additional warning signs. In fact, it is clear
that the additional warning signs had already been installed, and in any event, it is clear from
the photographs that advance warning signs were present at the time of the accident.
Paragraph 17(n) has no citation to the record. However, it is true that no active
warning devices were even installed. It is untrue that no improvements to the passive devices
were ever made, since it is undisputed that advance warning signs and pavement markings
were installed prior to the accident. See photographs (R. 774-778) of the signs identified by
the investigating officer at R. 803-809, the photographs (Addendum C). In addition,
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photographs taken by an investigator from the Federal Raihoad Administration the day after
the accident are found at R. 205-209 (Addendum B).
Paragraph 18 may be true, but is irrelevant to any issues presented in this appeal.
"Disputed Material Facts." In paragraph 20, appellants dispute that the signs were
visible the night of the collision, and rely, as usual, on the suspect Affidavit of Archie
Burnham. It is, however, beyond dispute that the signs were visible because:
1.

The photographs taken shortly after the accident show that the

signs and pavement markings were in place and visible. The testimony of
Officer CaiTuth and City Engineer Haight in that regard are not disputed.
Respectively, R. 803-809 and 179-209. Photographs show the approach to the
crossing, and the crossing itself, at R. 205-209, and R. 774-778, and the
authenticity of the photographs is not in dispute. At Addendum B are five
photographs (Exhibits 3-7) identified by Officer Carruth. All of the photos
except Exhibit 7 are taken by him through the windshield of his patrol car.
Exhibit 3 is taken northbound and shows the forty mile-an-hour speed limit
sign. Exhibit 4 shows the reverse turn sign and, in the background, the
raihoad advance warning sign and the stop sign ahead warning sign. Exhibit
5 is a closer view of the raihoad advance warning sign and the stop sign
advance warning sign. Pavement markings can be seen in the vicinity of the
raihoad advance warning sign. Exhibit 6 shows what a driver would see as he
makes the turn to approach the crossing. The stop sign and railroad crossbuck
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are clearly visible, and neither is obscured. Exhibit 7 is taken looking south,
the direction from which the train came. The police car is stopped pointing
eastbound, similar to the cars in the caravan. The sides, or edges, of the
crossbucks and the stop sign can be seen immediately in front of the police
car.
The photographs taken by the investigator from the Federal Railroad
Administration are found at Addendum C, and identified in the Affidavit of
Gordon Haight (R. 179-209). At R. 205, photograph No. 1 is looking
northbound and shows the reverse turn sign with the advance warning signs
in the background. Photograph 2, at R. 205, is a closer view of the railroad
advance crossing sign, with associated pavement marking. The stop sign
advance sign is seen in the backgiound. Photograph 4 at R. 207 is closer view
of the "stop sign ahead" warning sign, and the stop sign and crossbuck can be
seen in the backgiound. Photograph 5, at R. 206, is taken just before a vehicle
would turn to go east and cross the tracks. The stop sign and crossbucks are
visible in the right portion of the photograph. Photograph 7, at R. 207, shows
the stop sign and crossbucks as one makes the turn to go east. Photograph 8,
at R. 209, is taken on the west side of the tracks, looking south. The crossbuck
and the edge of the stop sign are seen in the left foreground. Photograph 10,
at R. 209, is looking south down the track from the center of the crossing, in
the direction from which the train came.
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2.

The testimony of the surviving caravan participants is contrary

to appellants' claim. They all saw the stop sign at the crossing and nobody
was confused.
Jacque Zimmerman, the driver of the first car, stopped at the stop sign
and recalled both the stop sign and the crossbuck (R. 1413, pp. 37, 58).
Jacob Wattleworth was in the back seat of the Zimmerman Honda.
While it was stopped at the crossing he could see the stop sign and crossbuck
(R. 1414, p. 55).
Lindsey Hackett was in the front passenger seat of Zimmerman's
Honda. When they stopped at the crossing she could see the stop sign and the
railroad crossing sign, and there was no question in her mind that they were
at a railroad crossing (R. 1415, pp. 22-23, R. 921-922).
Whitney Hill was driving the third vehicle in the caravan behind the
Larrabee vehicle. She saw the Zimmerman car stop at the stop sign (R. 1416,
pp. 25-28).
Abram Sant was in the front passenger's seat of the third vehicle. He
knew there was a crossing, and recalls the advance warning signs and the
painted railroad crossing warning on the pavement (R. 1419, pp. 31, 43-44, R.
393,394-395).
Melinda McCullough was in the back seat of the third vehicle. She
recalls seeing the crossbuck, stop sign, and an advance warning sign, all of
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which were in place the night of the accident (R. 1418, pp. 20-21, R. 517-518).
Subparagraphs 21(a), (b) and (c) recite statements made at one time or another by
either the UDOT or the City, recognizing that the at-grade crossing was hazardous or in need
of improvement. However, the photographs rebut the claim that there was a "very bad
crossing angle" and poor sight distances. As is obvious from the photographs, a northbound
train could be seen for many blocks to the south, and it is undisputed that the road crossed
the track at a ninety-degree angle. See, e.g., the photographs and Deposition of Melinda
McCullough (R. 1418, pp. 20-24).
Subparagraphs 21(d) and (e) constitute conjecture and speculation. Brent Larrabee
stopped for three seconds at the crossing and then pulled out in front of the train. Appellants
claim the only reasonable inference is that he could not see the train; however, the plaintiffs
never explain why. In any event, inattentiveness or recklessness on the part of the first or
second driver in the caravan proves nothing about the adequacy of the warning devices. All
they were designed to do was to advise a driver of the fact of a railroad crossing, and make
a driver stop, which they did.
Paragraph 22 is simply a rehash of the appellants' usual arguments, rebutted by the
testimony of the witnesses and the photographs.
Paragraphs 23-26 are irrelevant to any issues in this appeal involving the City.
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V.
A.

CITY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Accident Scene and Warning Signs
1.

The accident occurred at the crossing of 300 West and the railroad track at

about 10200 South. 300 West is a frontage road mnning generally north and south, west of
Interstate 15. From 10600 South, north for four blocks to 10200 South, it runs along the west
side of the railroad track. At 10200 South, the road turns right for a short distance, crosses
the track at a ninety-degree angle, and then turns left and proceeds north, to the east of the
railroad track. At Addendum A is a rough diagram of the vicinity.
2.

The caravan proceeded north on 300 West. In order, the signs which were

tliere to be seen, up to the railroad crossing, were (a) a white-and-black 40 mph speed limit
sign; (b) a reverse turn sign; (c) an advance railroad crossing sign (round, yellow-and-black,
with a cross and two capital Rs thereon); at about the same location advance railroad
crossing warning pavement markings were painted on the asphalt; (d) advance stop sign
warning sign (yellow warning sign with depiction of stop sign with arrow pointing forward);
(e) red reflectorized stop sign, with stop line pavement marking at Hie crossing; and (f) whiteand-black reflectorized crossbucks at the crossing.
The investigating officer, Jack Carruth, identified each of the foregoing signs, which
are depicted in Exhibits 3 through 7 of his deposition (found at Addendum B). All of the
signs referred to were in place and visible on the night of the accident (Carruth Depo.
R. 1420, pp. 57-64, 74-79, R.804-809; Affidavit of Gordon Haight, R. 179-209, p. 180);
identifying photos taken by Federal Railroad Administration (found at Addendum C).
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All of the signs and markings are appropriate to warn traffic approaching a railroad
crossing, and are specifically recognized and authorized by the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices promulgated by the Federal Highway Administration (the "MUTCD"), and
which has been adopted for use upon highways within the State of Utah by § 41-6-20, Utah
Code Annotated (1953) (Affidavit of Gordon Haight, R. 183, found at Addendum C).
B.

Effectiveness of the Warning Signs
The warning signs in place on the night of the accident constituted a "passive traffic

control system." Its sole purpose is to identify and direct a driver's attention to the location
of a grade crossing, so the driver can take appropriate action, i.e., stopping and looking for
trains (R. 179-184, 195-204). In that respect, the signs worked, since the drivers and
passengers of the first and third cars in the caravan have testified that they knew there was
a crossing, they could see the stop sign and crossbuck, and they all stopped.
C.

Testimony of Drivers and Passengers of Vehicles
Jacque Zimmerman was driving the first car in the Caravan, a Honda. She pulled

up and stopped at the stop sign, and then started across the tracks. While on the tracks she
saw the train coming from her right (R. 1413, p. 37). She saw the lights of the train on the
side of her car (R. 1413, p. 38). She was generally familiar with the advance warning signs
for northbound traffic; she has no recollection of any signs missing. She recalls the stop sign
and the crossbuck at the crossing (R. 1413, pp. 56-58).
Jacob Wattleworth was in the back seat of Jacque Zimmerman's Honda. Jacque
pulled up to the stop sign at the crossing and stopped at a right angle. He looked up and
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down the tracks and did not see a train (R. 1414, pp. 20-22, R. 919-921). Jacque then pulled
forward onto the tracks and at that time, he noticed the train because the train headlights
suddenly illuminated the side of Jacque's car (p. 22, R. 921). At that time, he looked to his
right and saw the train (p. 23, R. 922). Jacque then sped up across the tracks to get out of
the way (p. 24. R. 923). While Jacque was stopped at the crossing, he could see the stop sign
and crossbuck (p. 55).
Lindsey Hackett was in the front passenger seat of Jacque's Honda (R. 1415, p. 15).
Jacque pulled up and stopped at tlie stop sign at tlie crossing (p. 21, R. 921-922). While they
were stopped at the crossing, she could see the stop sign and the railroad crossing sign.
There was no question in her mind that they were at a railroad track (pp. 22-23, R. 921-922).
She saw Jacque look both ways and then she pulled onto the tracks (pp. 24-25, R. 923).
Lindsey looked to her right and saw a light on the track; it took her a couple of seconds to
realize it was a train and it was too close for comfort (R. 1415, pp. 25-26, 40).
Whitney Hill was driving the third vehicle (R. 1416, p. 12). At about halfway
between 10600 South and the accident scene, Becky Knapp mentioned that there was a train,
and Whitney turned and looked and saw the train, and heard the train's air Jiorn as it went
through tlie crossing at 10600 South (R. 919-921). She saw the Zimmerman car stop at the
stop sign and tlie Larrabee car stop right behind it. She saw the Zimmerman car drive slowly
over the tracks, and also again noticed the train. The Larrabee car stopped, or almost
stopped, and then followed the Zimmerman car over the tracks and was hit by the train.
Whitney would not have driven onto the tracks when Zimmerman did (R. 1416, pp. 25-28).
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Abram Sant was in the front passenger seat of Whitney Hill's Jeep (R. 1419, p. 12.)
The three vehicles all arrived at the crossing at about the same time. The Tempo driven by
Brent Larrabee came to a complete stop (p. 26, R. 388). The Larrabee vehicle then rolled
rather slowly onto the tracks and then he saw it leap forward, however, it was then hit by the
train (pp. 28-29, R. 390-391). As they were driving north on 300 West, he heard the train
horn, apparently at it approached the 10600 South crossing. He looked back and saw the
train and could see its headlights (pp. 23-24, R. 385-386). He was aware of the train all the
way up to the time of the collision. At the time Brent Larrabee took off across the tracks,
Abram could see the train and it was close enough he knew there was danger of a collision
(p. 56, R. 403). He knew there was a crossing and was familiar with the advance warning
signs. He recalls seeing the painted railroad crossing warning on the pavement (p. 31,
R. 393).
Rebecca Knapp was in the back seat of the Jeep. As they drove west on 10600
South, she looked to the south as they crossed the railroad tracks and saw the train coming
about a half a mile away. She saw a big light (R. 1417, pp. 18-20, R. 638, 724-725). As
they drove north on 300 West she observed the train coming north towards the crossing
where the accident occurred (pp. 45-46, R. 733). She had no trouble seeing the train coming
all the way from 10600 South all the way up to the accident scene. There were no
obstructions to her view of the train as it approached the crossing (p. 47, R. 734). She saw
both the Zimmerman and Larrabee cars drive onto the track. She could see the train coming
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and could not think of any reason why Jacque Zimmerman or Brent Larrabee could not see
the train (R. 1417, pp. 53-55, R. 737-739).
Melinda McCullough was in the back seat of the Jeep on the passenger side
(McCullough Depo., p. 17, R. 516). She was familiar with the crossing and knew it was
protected by a crossbuck and stop sign and an advanced warning sign, all of which were in
place the night of the accident (pp. 20-21, R. 517-518). A car stopped at the stop sign would
be pretty much at a 90 degree angle. It is easier to see up and down the track if you are
closer to the stop sign (pp. 23-24). As they drove north on 300 West, she watched the train
approach (pp. 27-28, R. 522). She saw the Honda and the Tempo pull up to the crossing.
The Honda came to almost a complete stop, and the Tempo came to a complete stop for one
or two seconds. Zimmerman drove on over the tracks and Larrabee pulled up and stopped
again for perhaps two or three seconds and then drove onto the track in front of the train
(pp. 33-36, R. 523-526). The light from the train illuminated the side of Zimmerman's car
as it pulled across (R. 1418, p. 49). She could clearly see the train approaching and does
not understand why Brent Larrabee or Jacque Zimmerman apparently did not see the train
(pp. 51-52. R. 530-531).
D.

'.

.r

Background of the Crossing
The railroad track was probably constructed in the late 1800s. No one remembers

exactly when the road was built (Depo. of Richard Warne, R. 1422, p. 110); however,
railroad records indicate that it has maintained crossbucks at a crossing at that location since
before 1919 (Depo. of Orlando Miera, R. 1421, pp. 55-56). The crossing was within an
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unincorporated portion of Salt Lake County until South Jordan City annexed the area in 1979
(Warne Depo., R. 1422, pp. 13-14, R. 326-327). Since the road was not a state road and was
within unincorporated Salt Lake County prior to annexation, the road and crossing were
likely designed and constructed by Salt Lake County.
With the annexation, the City inherited a number of railroad crossings. The crossing
in question, along with others, was regularly reviewed and studied. See, for example, letter
dated May 21, 1990 from James Nelson at the UDOT to Mayor Hutchings and City
Administrator, Warne, of South Jordan (R. 1412, Exhibit u 4"); minutes of surveillance
review June 30, 1992, indicating that the crossing was inspected and evaluated by Mr. Miera
of the D&RG Railroad, Mr. Laubsch of the Federal Highway Administration, Messrs. Chang,
Nelson, and Arambula of the UDOT, and Ms. Witkowski, of the UDOT (R. 1412,
Exhibit "6"); minutes and agenda of the November 16, 1995 coordinating meeting involving
UDOT, the Federal Highway Administration, and the Railroad (R. 1412, Exhibit "10"),
which states:
The 1-15 railroad study is complete. An overpass will be placed at 10600
South. When the new railroad grade and the 10600 South overpass is
complete, an at grade crossing will be placed at about 10400 or 10500 South
and the 10200 South crossing will be closed. Until then, this project is on
hold.
E.

The City's Involvement With the Crossing
Depositions were taken of Richard Warne, who was the City Administrator (City

Manager) from May 1982 to September 1991; Gordon Haight, who was the City Engineer
from April 1994 until January 1996; Anthony Murphy, who was the City Administrator
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from September 1991 until August 1994.; David Millheim, who was the City Administrator
from January 1995 until August 1998; and Theron Hutchings, who was Mayor from 1986
until January 1998.
The testimony of those individuals, as it relates to the crossing, can be summarized
as follows: the crossing was considered hazardous (Millheim Depo., R. 1424, pp. 71-73),
just as any other at-grade crossing. The City's only options were to install gates and lights,
or to close the crossing, effectively closing 300 West from 10600 South to 9000 South. The
entire area was being developed and a new road was planned for various locations further
to the west.
To install train activated gates and lights was not a simple solution:
(1)

It would require the Utah Department of Transportation ranking

the crossing high enough on the priority list to receive federal funds which
were only sufficient to install such devices at a half a dozen crossings per year
in the entire state (Wanie Depo., R. 1422, pp. 105-107) (R. 1412, Exhibit 29);
(2)

All work within the railroad right-of-way is done by the railroad,

and it may need up to two years to get the project scheduled. (R. 1412,
Exhibit 33, p. 11);
(3)

Highway design standards would not authorize installation of

gates and lights at a crossing such as this which had a short, straight approach,
and additional property would have to be acquired on each side of the track to
allow for a longer straight approach to the crossing (Haight Depo., R. 1425,
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pp. 51-54); this would mean that the City would have to buy or condemn
property and rebuild the road. This was possible, although expensive, on the
west side of the track. It was not, however, feasible on the east side because
of the close proximity of the 1-15 right-of-way. Assuming that the 1-15 rightof-way could be infringed on, simply to realign the road would cost hundreds
of thousands of dollars, which would be the expense of South Jordan City
(Haight Depo., R. 1425, pp. 32-35; 50-54) (Millheim Depo., R. 1424, pp. 8688); and
(4)

While the UDOT had approved the crossing for installation of

active control devices, the project had never been funded (Warne Depo.,
R. 1422, pp. 100-102).
South Jordan did not have funds to spare, and the City officials prioritized their
expenditures (Hutcliings Depo., R. 1423, p. 17.) That project, which was in part contingent
on the 1-15 rebuild and constiiiction of a raikoad grade separation at 10600 South, obtaining
participation of developers, and coordinating with Sandy City (whose City limits were a
short distance to the north), created a host of political, financial and practical problems which
resulted in delays in constructing the new frontage road and closing the crossing.
The City's ultimate plan was to build a new road at 400 or 500 West and close the
crossing af 10200 South. The new road had not been constructed as of the accident.
(Hutcliings Depo., R. 1423, pp. 27-30.) It was the City's plan to eventually close the
crossing and not to spend money on installing gates and lights and reconfiguring the road,
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which would soon be closed anyway. See Wame Depo., R. 1422, pp. 33-36, 43-45, 86-90;
Millheim Depo., R. 1424, pp. 44-49.
Nor was closing the crossing a simple solution, as 300 West had come to be relied on
by a number of businesses in the area. Closing 300 West diverted traffic to 9000 South,
causing additional problems there, and significant political problems, as the City learned.3
At page 41 of their brief, plaintiffs falsely claim that the City had "reneged" on a
pledge to place "additional passive warning devices" at the crossing in 1992, and cite the
deposition of Orlando Miera, a Railroad employee.
However, Mr. Miera, for whatever reason, simply confused the terms "active" and
"passive," which is clear from a fair reading of his deposition, and the correction sheet that
he filed thereafter, and it is misleading and unfair of the plaintiffs to claim that Mr. Miera
testified that the City had never installed any passive warning devices. What he meant to say
(and what is the fact) is that the City never installed any active crossing devices (Miera
Depo., R. 1421, pp. 45-46, 108-113; correction sheet dated October 7, 1998).
Anthony Murphy, the City Administrator in 1992, testified that there was an
agreement between the City, the Railroad and the UDOT, and discussion to the effect that
South Jordan would place additional passive warning devices at the crossing, consisting of
3

After the accident the City closed the crossing, which resulted in complaints from
nearby businesses and residents, complaints from the Sandy City Public Works, police and
fire departments, and the filing of a lawsuit in Third District Court to force the reopening of
the road. See Standard Plumbing Supply Company, Inc., et aL, plaintiffs and Sandy City,
intervening plaintiff, vs. South Jordan City, Third District Court, Civil No. 96-0901387,
J. Dennis Frederick. As of this date, the new road has been partially constructed, the 1-15
rebuild is in progress and the upgrade separation at 10600 South is due to be completed
this year. (Millheim Depo., R. 1424, pp. 75.78).
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an advance warning sign and some pavement markings. That was done shortly thereafter,
and, Murphy confirmed same by letter to the Department of Transportation dated July 28,
1992 (Murphy Depo., R. 1426, pp. 67-69; R. 1412, Exhibit 7, Addendum D). The passive
warning system which was in place at the crossing as of the time of the accident had been
recommended to the City by the Utah Department of Transportation, on whose engineering
expertise the City relied (Murphy Depo., R. 1426, pp. 78-80).4 As is obvious from the
photographs, these signs were in place and visible to northbound traffic at the time of the
accident.
It is tine that both the UDOT and tlie City have, on various occasions, recognized that
the crossing is "dangerous" and/or that the existing passive protection is "inadequate."
However, contrary to the plaintiffs' inference, the UDOT never "directed" or "ordered"
South Jordan City to do anything, and whether the UDOT legally could have is
problematical; it never tried. In any event, tlie City, tlie UDOT, the Railroad, and the FHWA
were in agreement by 1992 that the best, long-term, solution would be to close the crossing
after a new frontage road was built. (R. 1412, Ex. 7, and Depo. Exhs. 6, 10 and 28 attached
to the Affidavit of Gordon Haight, Addendum C).

4

Tlie Department of Transportation, for some reason, was apparently under the
erroneous impression that new signs had not been installed and sent a letter to Mr. Murphy
dated October 20, 1992, confirming that the crossing required advance warning signs and
pavement markings (R. 1412, Ex. 28). It is clear, however, that all warning signs
required by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices were in fact in place as of the
date of the accident.
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Appellants have argued that "to do nothing was not an option." However, the City
did not "do nothing." The City installed proper warning signs consistent with the UDOT's
recommendation in 1992, and properly maintained them up to the date of the accident.
Appellants claim that UDOT opined that lights and gates should be installed as early
as 1979, which is true. There is, however, no evidence that the crossing was ranked high
enough on tlie UDOT's priority list to obtain federal funding, and concluding that gates and
lights would be nice is not the same as having funding to install them.
Appellants claim that tlie crossing could have been upgraded at a nominal cost to the
City (assuming that roadway realignment was not required). In any event, the documents do
not establish that funding of improvements at the crossing had been finally approved. The
May 21, 1990, letter to Mayor Hutchings from the UDOT (R. 1412, Ex. 4, Addendum D)
is instructive. At the outset, it is not a "directive" or "order" from the UDOT to the City.
It merely sets out two options, closing tlie crossing and rerouting the road, or installing gates
and liglits at tlie crossing. If the City were to opt for the latter, the City would be obligated
for ten percent of the cost, estimated to be $130,000 (exclusive of road realignment). But,
tlie letter goes on, //tlie City agreed to participate, then the UDOT would proceed to prepare
a Design Study Report and request approval for preliminary engineering from the Federal
Highway Administration, and for the Railroad to prepare detailed plans and estimates. Then,
//approval is received and plans are prepared, the UDOT will prepare formal agreements
with the Railroad. Then the UDOT will prepare a cooperative agreement with the City.
Then the Railroad agreement will be submitted to the FHWA requesting authorization to
proceed with die work. If the FHWA approves, then the Railroad agreement is submitted to
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the Railroad Company. In other words, final approval of the project was subject to a number
of contingencies, and it is speculative that this project would have gotten anywhere, as the
FHWA would likely not approve funds for a crossing which was not even on the priority list.
Appellants' claim that the UDOT had always insisted that the crossing be upgraded
is simply not borne out by the documentary evidence. Attached as Addendum D are five key
documents which illustrate the status of the crossing at the time of the accident. Exhibit 4
is a letterfromthe UDOT to Mayor Hutchings, setting forth alternatives and then, assuming
that the City decided to leave the crossing intact, encouraging the City's commitment to
participate in an upgrade of the crossing. The letter then sets forth, in the last two
paragraphs, a number of conditions and contingencies which remained unfulfilled. Exhibit
5, minutes of a meeting in April 1992, recite that a new master plan had been developed
which included a grade separation at 10600 South. Exhibit 6, minutes of a meeting or June
30, 1992, provide in part that it was agreed by the UDOT, South Jordan, and the Federal
Highway Administration that "South Jordan will place passive warning devices at the
existing 10200 South crossing and will then move them to the new crossing at 10400 South
when they close the existing crossing." Exhibit 7 is a letter from the City Administrator
IS,

dated July 28, 1992, to the UDOT, stating the City's understanding of the current status of
the crossing, including that the City has completed the additional signage and warnings, and
that the crossing will remain open until the new frontage road is completed sometime in the
next five years. Exhibit 10 is die November 16, 1995, coordinating meeting agenda prepared
by the UDOT, to the effect that the 10200 South crossing "is on hold" pending completion
of the oveipass at 10600 South, and the new at-grade crossing.
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VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Passive warning devices only advise a driver of the fact of a crossing, and alert the
driver to stop. At that point, by statute, a driver is obligated to stop, look and listen, and
yield to a train which is close enough to constitute a hazard. In this case, the signs did their
job, as each vehicle in the caravan stopped, and each of the survivors has acknowledged they
knew they were at a railroad crossing, and that is why they stopped.
The district court should be affirmed in all respects, because:
First, there is no showing that there was anything wrong with the passive warning
devices in place. The testimony of the witnesses and the unchallenged photographs clearly
show that the warning signs were upright, bright, and visible, and gave ample notice of the
fact of a crossing. Thus, to the extent that the City has a duty to warn of a potentially
dangerous condition, that duty was fulfilled.
Second, the district court was correct in rejecting the claim that the City was obligated
to install some other or additional warning or traffic control devices, because:
a.

A municipality has no legal duty to install any particular type of sign

or warning device, even at a "dangerous" location. If signing is installed, it need only
provide adequate, not perfect, signing. Once the municipality installs devices, its obligation
is limited to maintaining them in a reasonably safe and visible condition. The City need only
ensure that "some visible warning signage is present on the public road," and that duty was
discharged.
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b.

The discretionary function exception to liability (§ 63-30-10(1) of the

Governmental Immunity Act) retains immunity for the City with regard to decisions as to
whether to upgrade the protection at the crossing.
Third, summary judgment was proper because plaintiffs have not met their burden of
showing a causal connection between the negligent conduct complained of and the injury to
the plaintiffs. In other words, there is no evidence that any problem with the passive warning
devices in any way interfered with Mr. Larrabee's ability to stop at the crossing, and yield
to a train close enough to constitute a hazard.5
The district court was correct in striking the Affidavit of Archie Burnham, which
consists of little more than a bare assertion that Mr. Bumham has reviewed the facts, and is
of the opinion that tlie crossing was dangerous. The affidavit is deficient under Rule 56(e),
U.R.C.P., because it lacks the specific facts that logically support the conclusions therein.
In any event, tlie affidavit is irrelevant to the issue of the City's duty, either at common law
or under the Governmental Immunity Act, since tlie City has no duty to install any particular
type of warning devices at any intersection, regardless of how "dangerous" it is.
Appellants' complaints about the signs and pavement markings are, essentially, that
they were not visible at all, or not soon enough. This complaint might make sense if the

^The District Court granted summary judgment to the City because it owed no duty
to install additional warning devices and in any event, the devices in place worked and thus
any duty was fulfilled. This Court may affirm on that basis, or on any other ground raised
below, including governmental immunity and lack of evidence of causation. See DeBry
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995).
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decedent had simply driven onto the crossing without stopping. However, the signs and
markings must have been visible, since every car in the caravan came to a complete stop.
VII.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Correctly Held That the City Breached No Duty.
The City is not the insurer of the safety of everyone who travels on its roads. The

City's duty is to maintain its roads in a reasonable safe condition and to exercise reasonable
care to warn travelers of potentially unsafe locations, such as railroad crossings. See, e.g.,
Fishbaiigh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (UT 1998). There is no duty to erect any
paiticular traffic control device; the law requires only that once the municipality takes action
to install such devices, it must do so in a non-negligent manner and maintain traffic control
devices in a reasonably safe and visible condition. Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556
(UtahCt. App. 1992).
In the instant case, it is undisputed that advance warning signs were in place advising
of the curve, the railroad crossing, and the stop sign. At the crossing itself were a stop sign
and crossbucks which were clearly visible. Eveiyone in the Caravan knew they were
approaching a crossing and stopped.
The signs did their job: each of the surviving drivers and passengers testified that they
knew that they were at a railroad crossing. At that point, responsibility shifts to the driver
to comply with § 41-6-95, Utah Code:
(1)
Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade
crossing, the driver of the vehicle shall stop within 50 feet, but not less than
15 feet from the nearest rail of the railroad track and may not proceed if:
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* * *

(c)
A railroad train approaching within approximately 1,500
feet of the highway crossing emits a signal audible from such
distance and the train by reason of its speed or nearness to the
crossing is an immediate hazard;
(d)
An approaching train is plainly visible and is in
hazardous proximity to the crossing; or
(e)
There is any other condition that makes it unsafe to
proceed through the crossing.
In Jones, supra, the Court held that the City had no duty to install any particular
traffic control device at an intersection. The Court concluded that a city is not generally
liable for failure to install signs or signals and has no duty to exercise its discretion. Rather,
the common law requires only that once the municipality installs a sign, it must do so in a
nonnegligent manner and maintain same in a reasonably safe, visible and working condition.
834 P.2d at 560. There is no dispute in the instant case but that the signs in place for the
plaintiffs' decedents were reasonably safe, visible and in working condition. See also,
deVilliersv. Utah County, etal, 882P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994), cert den. 890 P.2d 1034,
holding that Utah County had no duty to erect warning signs, even at a "dangerous"
intersection.6

6

Only if the City put up a particular warning device and then failed to maintain it,
for example, failing to replace it if knocked down, might the City be liable. Compare
Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992) (no duty to erect any particular
traffic control device) and the Court of Appeals decision in Duncan v. Union Pacific (no
liability "if some visible warning signage is present on the public road") with Bowen v.
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) (stop sign knocked down) and Nelson v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) (failing to repair hole in fence between
playground and river).
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B.

The City's Decisions Regarding the Crossing Are Immune as Discretionary,
Railroad crossing suits have been brought against the railroads for years. See, e.g.

English v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 P.47 (Utah 1896). The first reported case where a claim
was brought against a governmental entity for alleging failing to put up more and/or better
warning devices was Velasquez v. Union Pacific and the Utah Public Service Commission,
469 P.2d 5 (UT 1970), where the plaintiff claimed that the Public Service Commission
(which at that time had responsibility for railroad crossings) should be liable because the
railroad crossing did not have warning devices to the plaintiffs liking. The Utah Supreme
Court made short work of his claim, pointing out that by statute (§ 54-4-14), the Public
Service Commission had the power to require certain appropriate safety devices at crossing,
but that obviously the claim arose out of the exercise or failure to exercise a discretionary
function or to conduct an inspection, both of which were (and are) immunized by § 63-3010(1)(4), Utah Code.7 The Court noted:
The statute gives the respondent the power to require a different safety device
at the crossing in question, but that does not mean that the plaintiff should
recover simply because a better warning signal could or should have been
installed.
In Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande and Utah Department of Transportation, 749 P.2d
660 (Utah App. 1988), this court affirmed summary judgment for the UDOT where it was
alleged that UDOT breached its duty under §§ 54-4-14 through 15.1, Utah Code, to "install,
7

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act at die time of the instant accident provided
in Section 10 that "immunity from s u i t . . . is waived . . . except if the injury arises out
of, in connection with, or results from: (1) the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused . . .
(4) A failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection.
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maintain and improve safety signals and devices" even though there was in place a yellow
advance warning sign, a crossbuck, and a stop sign at the crossing. The plaintiff claimed that
UDOT should have known of the dangerous condition of the crossing and that it negligently
failed to install some more elaborate safety signals or devices. The Court of Appeals took
note of Velasquez, supra, and went on to apply the discretionary function test earlier set forth
in Little v. Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) which are:
(1)
Does the challenged act, omission or decision necessarily involve a
basic governmental policy, program or objective?
(2)
Is the questioned act, omission or decision essential to the realization
or accomplishment of that policy program or objective?
(3)
Does the act, omission or decision require the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental entity
involved?
(4)
Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite
constitutional statutory or other lawful authority and duty to make the act,
omission or decision complained of?
The Court held that the discretionary function exception clearly applied to the UDOT and
affirmed summary judgment in its favor. The analysis by the Court of Appeals, as it relates
to the Utah Department of Transportation, is equally applicable to the City of South Jordan.
Like the UDOT, the basic governmental objectives involved is the regulation of traffic and
public safety. Evaluating the railroad crossing was, of course, essential to the realization of
that goal and prioritization was necessary because of limited public funds. The City, through
its own engineering staff, and reliance on the expertise of the UDOT, exercised basic policy
evaluation, judgment and expertise. Like the UDOT, the City has legal authority to supervise
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and regulate the safety of its roads. See, for example, §§ 10-8-8, 30, 32, and 33, Utah Code8,
which provide generally that cities may establish streets and roads and regulate traffic
thereon.
In 1990, this Court decided Duncan v. Union Pacific and the Utah Department of
Transportation, 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990). Duncan arose from an accident occurring
on a state road which crossed the Union Pacific tracks. The UDOT had periodically
evaluated the crossing, but it was never found necessaiy to install additional safety
improvements, such as gates and lights. The Court applied Gleave, concluded that UDOT's
decisions were discretionary, and affirmed summary judgment. The Court rejected the
notion that the UDOT should be liable for "its failure to better warn and control traffic at the
crossing," and noted:
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominately fiscal matters.
Eveiy highway could probably be made safer by further expenditures, but we
will not hold UDOT (and implicitly, the Legislature) negligent for having to
strike a difficult balance between the need for greater safety and the burden for
funding improvements.
* * *

. . . The net effect of this holding is that if the railroad's right-of-way does not
negligently obscure an oncoming train, the train is properly operated, and if
some visible warning signage is present on the public road, then the plaintiff
is not entitled to relief in tort for an injury at the crossing . . . . (emphasis
added)
8

Section 10-8-30 provides, in relevant part, that cities "may regulate the movement
of traffic on the streets . . . including the movement of pedestrians as well as of vehicles,
and the cars and engines of railroads . . . . In Section 10-8-11 provides that cities "may
regulate the use of streets, alleys, avenues. . . ." Section 10-8-33 provides that cities may
"permit, regulate, or prohibit the locating, constructing or laying of the tracks of any
railroad, or tramway in any street, alley or public place . . . ."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
32may contain errors.

Visible warning signage which was effective to alert Mr. Larrabee was in place at the
time of this accident, and Duncan v. Union Pacific, by itself, mandates summary judgment
in favor of South Jordan.
The Court of Appeals decision in Duncan was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court
in Duncan v. Union Pacific, 842 P.2d 832 (UT 1992):
We reaffirm our holding in Velasquez that the duties imposed upon UDOT in
these particulars are truly discretionary functions and are, therefore, protected
by governmental immunity.
842 P.2d at 835.
Other decisions by the Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court make it clear
that decisions by governmental entities, including cities, as to what types of signs should be
installed at a particular location on a public road are discretionary.
In Keegan v. Utah Department of Transportation, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995), the
Supreme Court again visited the issue of what is a discretionary function. The Court held
that the UDOT's decision not to raise a concrete median banier on 1-80 was discretionary
and the UDOT was immune from suit. The Court reaffirmed the teachings of Duncan v.
Union Pacific and Velasquez, and quoting from the Court of Appeals opinion in Duncan, the
Court restated:
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominately fiscal matters.
Every highway could probably be made safer by further expenditures, but we
will not hold UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) negligent for having to
strike a difficult balance between the need for greater safety and the burden of
funding improvements. In accordance with this principal, we conclude that the
decision made in this case is analogous to the decisions addressed in
Velasquez, Duncan, and Rocky Ml Thrift The plaintiffs' claims in Velasquez
and Duncan concern decisions not to upgrade allegedly defectively marked
railroad crossing warning devices; Rocky Mt. Thrift involved questions
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surrounding the design of a city flood control system. Like the case at bar, all
three cases addressed basic policy-based decisions. As stated by this Court in
Duncan, since the said decisions were "the result of serious and extensive
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise in numerous areas of concern . . .
the duties imposed upon UDOT in relation to those decisions "are truly
discretionary functions and are therefore protected by governmental immunity
[under § 63-30-10], at 624-625.
South Jordan City properly exercised its discretion in deciding to eventually close the
crossing after the new road was built, and not to squander its resources by installing gates
and lights, and rebuilding the approaches to the crossing, only to abandon same a few years
later. The City submits that all of the legal, political, public policy evaluation, and practical
reasons for immunizing the UDOT for railroad crossing claims, apply equally to the City of
South Jordan
The latest case dealing with discretionary function is Trujillo v. UDOT, 986 P.2d 752
(1999 Utah Ct. App.). Trujillo held that the UDOT was not entitled to immunity where it
had allowed the placement of plastic barrels every 100 feet to separate two-way traffic on
1-84, failed to reduce the speed limit as required by the Traffic Control Plan, the errors and
omissions were made at the operational level, and the Traffic Control Plan was formulated
by an unlicensed, low-level UDOT employee.

Trujillo, however, recognizes those

circumstances where discretionary function immunity is appropriate, for example: the
exception "shields those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large numbers of
people in a myriad of unforeseen waysfromindividual and class legal actions, the continual
threat of which would make public administration all but impossible," at 758, \ 20.
Discretionaiy function is not susceptible to precise definition in all legal contexts, but
discretionary acts are those "characterized by a high degree of discretion and judgment
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involved in weigliing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and
planning...," and that are "the result of serious and extensive policy evaluation, judgment,
and expertise in numerous areas of concern" % 22. Citing Keegan, the court noted that
decisions would be immunized which are "inherently bound up in economic, political, and
safety considerations . . .," at 759, \ 24.
In the instant case, the City's decisions regarding the crossing involved a number of
considerations: spending the City's money to upgrade the crossing, only to close same a few
years later, might, indeed, impact on a large number of people, and subject the City to threats
of individual and class legal actions. Further, as is clear from the testimony and documents
herein, the City's decision relative to the crossing involved a high degree of discretion and
judgment, weigliing alternatives, making choices with respect to public policy and planning,
was the result of extensive policy evaluation, judgment and expertise with regard to traffic
movement, urban planning and development, and financial concerns. The City's decisions
were inherently bound up in economic, political, and safety considerations. Discretionary
function immunity would not be available to the City under Trnjillo, only if the decisions
regarding the crossing had been made by a low-level employee and/or consisted or
negligently implementing the decision, for example, failing to install or maintain the passive
warning signs. In the instant case, it is clear that the signs were properly installed and
maintained, and the decisions in effect at the time of the accident were made by the highest
levels of City officials, including the Mayor and City Manager, and various engineers from
the Department of Transportation, the railroad, and the Federal Highway Administration.
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1.

Appellants5 Arguments Below

In their brief, appellants argue, as to the City, only the issue of duty. The City will
deal briefly with some of appellants' arguments regarding immunity that they made in the
court below, in the event similar arguments are raised in their reply brief.
Appellants argued that decisions regarding warning devices at railroad crossings are
not "governmental," because, since the Railroad could have done something about the
crossing, the City's acts are nongovernmental and thus not immunized. However, controlling
case law has always held that decisions relating to signing, and particularly signing at
railroad crossings, is "governmental." See, e.g. Velasquez v. Union Pacific, Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande, and Duncan v. Union Pacific, supra. See also, McCorvey v. Utah
DOT, 808 P.2d 431 (UT 1993); Ledfors v. Emery County, 849 P.2d 1162 (UT 1993).
Appellants also argued that the discretionary function immunity granted by § 63-3010 was subordinated to § 63-30-8, which waives immunity for injuries caused by defective
or dangerous conditions of streets. However, the proper analysis was stated in Ledfors,
supra:
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that we address three
questions in determining whether a governmental entity is immune from suit.
First, was the activity the entity performed a governmental function and
therefore immunized from suit by the general grant of immunity contained in
§ 63-30-3? . . . Second, if the activity was a governmental function, has
some other section of the Act waived that blanket immunity? Third, if the
blanket immunity has been waived, does the Act also contain an exception to
that waiver which results in a retention of an immunity against the particular
claim asserted in this case? (at 1164.)
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This analysis was applied in a road case in Keegan v. State of Utah, supra. The
Supreme Court concluded that activities relating to the construction and maintenance of a
roadway could only be performed by a governmental agency and thus such activities are
"governmental." The Court then determined that, while § 63-30-8 waives immunity for
injuries caused by a defective road, nevertheless, the discretionary function exception in
Section 10 trumps the waiver of Section 8 and that this principle has been well recognized
by Utah case law since Velasquez v. Union Pacific.
Plaintiffs also argued that the City's decision not to install lights and gates at the
crossing was not the exercise of a discretionary function. Plaintiffs conceded that the City's
decision meet the first two tests of the Little v. Division of Family Sennces, 667 P.2d 49
(Utah 1983), four-part test for determining discretionaiy function, but argued that the City's
activities did not meet the third and fourth tests. Their argument was apparently that, since
UDOT had determined that lights and gates were "required" at the crossing, that that was the
end of the inquiry and the City could not therefore exercise any basic policy evaluation,
judgment and expertise.9 Keegan v. UDOT, however, is to the contrary. There, the third
test was satisfied where the UDOT had studied and debated the proposed action and its costs
and benefits, just as the City did here, albeit with the concurrence and cooperation of the
UDOT, the Railroad and the Federal Agency concerned.

^ l e basic premise of this argument is flawed. While the UDOT at one time may
have tliought that lights and gates were appropriate, it is undisputed that as of the time of
the subject accident, all parties concerned had agreed that a new frontage road would be
constructed and the crossing eventually closed, and in the meantime that it would be
protected with passive warning devices. See Addendum D.
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Plaintiffs also argued below that the City did not "possess the requisite constitutional,
statutory or lawful authority to make the challenged act, omission or decision" (the fourth
test under Little). The argument is unclear, but is apparently that since UDOT has authority
over what types of crossing devices are to be installed, that the City then has nothing to say
about it. They also asserted that "once UDOT determines that a crossing requires active
warning devices, it issues a directive for the installation to the municipality with jurisdiction
over the crossing." However, there is no support for this proposition anywhere in the
evidence or in the statutory or case law and, again, Keegan is to the contrary; it held that
since the UDOT has authority over state highways the fourth test is met. Similarly, since the
City has authority over its streets under Chapter 10-8, Utah Code, the result should be the
same as in Keegan.
Sections 54-4-15, 15.1, 15.2 and 15.3, Utah Code, set forth the authority of the
Department of Transportation. The statute, unfortunately, is not a model of clarity. It
purports to give the DOT the power to direct modifications at railroad crossings, and to
determine how the cost is to be apportioned between the local authority and the railroad, with
the Public Service Commission to mediate disputes. It is clear, however, in § 15.1 that the
Depaitment shall "provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of
automatic and other safety appliances, signals, or devices at grade crossings on public
highways or roads. . . ." Thus, it is clear that the UDOT is responsible for what types of
crossing protection is to be installed. On the other hand, the City has the power under
Chapter 10-8, Utah Code, to regulate movement of traffic on its streets, may regulate the
constructing and locating of railroad tracks, etc. Thus, it is unclear whether the UDOT has
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the authority to direct or order the City to do anything. Fortunately, this Court need not
resolve tliese questions, because even assuming that the UDOT had the authority to order a
municipality how to spend its tax dollars, the simple fact is that the UDOT never ordered or
directed the City of South Jordan to do anything, never made any final determinations as to
who was to pay how much to upgrade the crossing, and, four years before the accident,
agreed that the crossing did not need to be upgraded, but protected only with additional
passive warning devices. Thus, appellants' arguments fail, both factually and legally.
C.

Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Because Plaintiffs Failed to Establish
Causation,
Appellants' basic theory is that active warning devices are better than passive warning

devices, which is true, but as seen above, the City has no duty to install such devices.
In addition, appellants have also alleged some vague deficiencies in the passive
signing system. However, even assuming, contrary to the evidence, that there was some
deficiency, the plaintiffs are still not entitled to recover. This is because every one of the
drivers in the caravan knew there was a railroad crossing and they all stopped for the stop
sign and crossbuck at the crossing. The passive warning signs performed their intended
function and tliere is no evidence that there was anything to keep Mr. Larrabee from seeing
the train. There is simply no causal link between any alleged defect in the signs and the
accident.
A prima facie case of negligence requires that the plaintiff show (1) a duty of
reasonable care extending to the plaintiffs; (2) breach of that duty by the defendant;
(3) proximate and actual causation; and (4) damages suffered by plaintiffs, see Clark v.
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Farmers Insurance Exchange, 893 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1995). In the context of a motion
for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden to show that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. However, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiffs still have the ultimate burden of proving all of the elements of their cause of action.
Further, once challenged, the party opposing such a motion must come forward with
sufficient proof to support its claim. Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah
1997). Assuming, arguendo, that there was some deficiency regarding the signs, plaintiffs
are unable to meet their burden of showing causation.
In Weber v. Springville, 725 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Utah 1986), a child fell in at some
unknown point along the shore of an unguarded stream. The Supreme Court affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the City because the plaintiffs could not establish where the
youngster fell into the creek. The Court held that the plaintiffs inability to establish factual
cause is fatal to their claim, and noted that "a mere possibility of such causation is not
enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the
probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the Court to direct a verdict
for defendant," 725 P.2d at 1367. The mle is well established in this jurisdiction that "when
the proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law."
Devinev. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073, 1083 (Utah 1955); Clark v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
Inc., supra; Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1997).
In Clark, the plaintiff was injured in a complicated multi-car accident. No one could
say for sure which of the defendants, if any of them, actually struck the plaintiff. The Court
affirmed summary judgment, noting that the trial court may rule as a matter of law on the
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issue of proximate cause when there is no evidence to establish a causal connection, thus
leaving causation to speculation.
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), a hotel guest was
murdered and claim was brought against the hotel for alleged inadequate security. The
Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment, because there was no direct evidence linking
the decedent's death with inadequate security, and any attempt to relate the death to the
alleged negligence of the hotel was completely speculative.
In the instant case, no one knows or will ever know why Brent Larrabee pulled out
in front of the Amtrak train. He may or may not have seen the train, or misjudged its speed
or distance, or decided blindly to follow the car in front of him. There is, however,
absolutely no evidence that he did not know that he was at a railroad crossing. The claim
that the signs were the cause of LaiTabee's alleged failure to see the train must be based on
pure speculation, and plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed for failure to establish causation,
actual or proximate.
D.

The District Court Properly Struck the Affidavit of Archie Burnham.
Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., provides that affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for

summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein." Once that foundation is laid, the affidavits also "must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," that is, the statements made by
the affiant must be relevant to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Affidavits that do not
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meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) are subject to being stricken, Howick v. Bank of Salt
Lake, 498 P.2d 352 (1972), and a motion to strike is appropriate in order for the court to test
whether the affidavits meet the requirements of Rule 56(e).
In addition, the Utah Rules of Evidence also require that statements of fact, to be
admissible, must be relevant, U.R.E. 402, and based on personal knowledge, U.R.E. 602.
The admissibility of opinion testimony is also expressly limited. If an opinion is
offered by an expert witness, that witness must be qualified to render the opinion "by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," U.R.E. 702. In either event, the
opinion must also be helpful to the court.
Affidavits containing expert opinions must also set forth foundational facts, that is,
specific facts that logically support the opinion. Batterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah
1992).
Finally, opinion testimony that offers a legal conclusion may not be considered. In
Dcnndson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Ut. App. 1991), the court held that an expert could not
render a conclusory opinion that a party's conduct was negligent. Clearly, it is only the
court, and not an expert witness, which is to decide issues of law, Ashton v. Ashtcn, 733 P.2d
147 (Utah 1987).
Applying the above principles to the affidavit of Archie Burnham (R. 889-892), it is
clear that his affidavit is deficient and inadmissible.10
10

The Affidavit advances two basic notions: first, that the signs were not visible and
presumably failed to advise of the fact of the crossing, and second, that regardless of the
visibility, die crossing was nevertheless dangerous. The first is factually false. The
second is irrelevant to the City's duty, deVilliers v. Utah County, supra.
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The various paragraphs thereof are deficient because: (a) there is no specific citation
to any traffic engineering standards or authorities; (b) there is no statement that the affiant
is even qualified to venture opinions, and his CV was not attached to the Affidavit; (c) many
of the terms are vague and undefined, including "background clutter," "excessive hazard,"
"angularity," "crossing geometry," "motorist distractions," "driver defects," "visibility
conditions," "deceptive and difficult," "fully reflectorized," "too close to stop," etc.; (d)
many of the assertions are irrelevant and argumentative, and speculative, for example, that
Brent Larrabee could not see the train; (e) some "facts" are based on double hearsay or
worse, for example, paragraph 13.
Paragraph 14 should be stricken, because tlie opinion that the crossing was "ultrahazardous" is a legal conclusion. Under Utah law a railroad cannot be liable for a crossing
accident unless tlie crossing is "more than ordinarily hazardous"; in making that
determination, die law requires an analysis of the facts in light of the legal duties owed by
tlie railroad to determine if there is liability, just as is done in analyzing whether a party
is negligent, see Duncan v. Union Pacific, 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992). Thus, in venturing
tlie opinion that the crossing was "ultra-hazardous," Mr. Burnham necessarily had to make
a legal conclusion of what duties the defendant railroad owed with respect to the crossing
and, even more improperly, extrapolating from case law involving railroad liability, and
attempting to apply same to municipal liability.
Paragraph 14D purports to state that the City had some legal duty to provide "traffic
control." Indeed, traffic control was in place, i.e., advance warning signs, pavement
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markings, a stop sign and crossbucks, and the City discharged any such duty. To the
extent paragraph 14D states that the City has a legal duty to install automatic flashing lights
and gates, same should be stricken as an inadmissible legal conclusion.
In summary, the Affidavit of Archie Burnham lacks specific factual foundation, and
is deficient under Rule 56(e) and Rules 701 through 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
While Mr. Burnham says that he has reviewed the accident report, some photographs, the
accident history, statements of witnesses, and conducted an on-site evaluation, such a
conclusory statement, without more, is insufficient.11 It is similar to the affidavit of the
expert in American Concept Insurance Company v. Lockheed, 751 P.2d 271 (Ut. Ct. App.
1988), which said only that the expert had reviewed the insurance company's file, and in
his opinion the insurance company had breached its duties of good faith and fair dealing
to its insured, but as the Utah Supreme Court noted four years later, in Buttetfield v.
Okubo: "[A] bare assertion that the expert has reviewed the facts and based his or her
opinion on them will not suffice. At 104.
In other words, to simply say that an affiant has looked at a "file" or a "report" or
"photographs," without setting forth the specific facts gleaned therefrom which are
relevant to an opinion, is not sufficient.

n

In addition, if the documentation reviewed consists of "reports, surveys . . . or
data compiled . . . for die purpose of identifying, evaluating, or planning the safety
enhancement of . . . railway-highway crossings [same] . . . shall not be subject to
discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding . . . ." 23
U.S.C.A. § 409. Nor does an affidavit based thereon need to be considered. See Duncan
v. Union Pacific, 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990), 597-598, n. 2.
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Plaintiffs rely on Gaw v. State DOT, 809 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), wherein
the Court concluded that the plaintiffs affidavits met the test in American Concept
Insurance Company, and that the affidavits were sufficient to raise an issue of material
fact. Two years later, however, the Utah Supreme Court decided Butterfield v. Okubo,
and effectively overruled Gaw. After a lengthy discussion regarding the conflict between
Rule 705 and Rule 56(e), the court explicitly held that
. . . affidavits must include not only the expert's opinion, but also the
specific facts that logically support die expert's conclusion. See Williams v.
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). In so doing, we stress the requirement
that Rule 56(e) requires specific facts. Contrary to the Utah Court of
Appeals statement in American Concept Insurance Company v. Lockhead,
751 P.2d 271, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), a bare assertion that the expert has
reviewed the facts and based his or her opinion on them will not suffice.
. . . Utah has long required nonexpert Rule 56 affiants to enumerate the
specific evidentiary facts in support of their conclusions. [Citations omitted.]
In recent years we have made clear that this standard also applies to a situation
in which the affiant testifies as an expert [citations omitted].
* * *

Utah is not alone in requiring experts' affidavits to include supporting factual
bases for their opinions. Numerous federal courts have found that factually
unsupported conclusions and affidavits are insufficient to withstand summary
judgment. [Citations omitted.] As the District of Columbia Circuit has
observed:
To hold that [the Rules of Evidence] prevent a court from
granting summary judgment against a party who relies solely on
an expert's opinion that has no more basis in or out of the record
than [the plaintiffs' experts] theoretical speculations would
seriously undermine the policies of Rule 56 . . . the position that
an expert's opinion that lacks any credible support creates an
issue of "fact" is clearly untenable. Merit Motors, Inc., v.
Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 566, 673, and n. 27 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(emphasis in original).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45

831 P.2d at 102-103. See also, Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App.
1998); Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904 (Utah Ct. App. 1997, n. 4).
The Burnham Affidavit is exacdy the kind of affidavit which was of concern to die
Utah Supreme Court in Butterfteld, and to die many courts cited in that opinion. It is the
sort of dieoretical speculation, unsupported by any specific factual basis, which should not
be considered in opposition to a valid motion for summary judgment. To allow this type
of affidavit to defeat a motion for summary judgment would greatly weaken Rule 56, and
its goal of weeding out meridess cases before trial. As noted by the court in Merit Motors
at 673:
We are unwilling to impose die fruitless expenses of litigation diat would
result from such a limitation on the power of a court to grant summary
judgment."
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The loss of die appellants' children in this accident was indeed a tragedy. However,
the City simply is not liable. The signs which were in place were sufficient to warn any
reasonable person of the existence of the crossing, and Mr. Larrabee should have stopped
and not proceeded until the train had cleared the crossing. The City has no legal duty to
install "active" devices, and its decisions regarding signing at the crossing are immune from
second-guessing by virtue of controlling case law and the Governmental Immunity Act. For
all of the reasons set forth above, the District Court should be affirmed in all respects.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £7_ day of March, 2000.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

GUUPU
farix. Larson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
City of South Jordan
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the BRIEF OF APPELLEE CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN to be mailed by first class United
States mail, postage pre-paid, to:
David J. Jordan, Esq.
Mark E. Hindley, Esq.
Stoel Rives, LLP
201 South Main Street #1100
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Robert A. Schuetze, Esq.
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1600 Broadway, Suite 1600
Denver, Colorado 80202
E. Scott Savage, Esq.
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ADDENDUM
Addendum A:

Diagram of vicinity of accident

Addendum B:

Photographs taken by the investigating police officer

Addendum C:

Affidavit of Gordon Haight, City Engineer, including
references to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices,
documents reflecting status of crossing, and photographs
taken by investigator from the Federal Railroad
Administration

Addendum D:

Correspondence, minutes and agenda setting forth status of
crossing as of date of accident
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ALLAN L. LARSON (A 1896)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant City of South Jordan
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL D. PRICE, SUSANNE Q.
PRICE, KENT SWENSEN, KAY
SWENSEN, ROSS LARRABEE and
CARMA LARRABEE,

AFFIDAVIT OF GORDON HAIGHT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 970903387WD
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION, SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, and
CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN,

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

GORDON HAIGHT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of 21 years and am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. From

approximately April 30, 1994, until the beginning of January 1996 I served as the City Engineer
for the City of South
Jordan.
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2.

I graduated from Brigham Young University in 1987 with a bachelor's degree in

civil engineering, and a master's degree in engineering management. Upon graduation I worked
for five years for Centennial Engineering as a professional civil engineer, until 1992 when
I worked for approximately one year for the City of West Jordan as the Staff Engineer. I was the
City Engineer for the City of Draper from 1992 until I went to work for the City of South Jordan
in the spring of 1994.
3.

I am a licensed Professional Engineer of the State of Utah, License No.

92-176319-2202.
4.

I have experience and training in traffic engineering, and am familiar with 300

West Street and the railroad crossing at 300 West and 10200 South in South Jordan, Utah. I am
familiar with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("the Manual") published by the
Federal Highway Administration and the United States Department of Transportation, which has
been adopted for use both by the Federal Highway Administration and the State of Utah.
5.

I visited the scene of the accident which is the subject of this lawsuit within a few

days thereafter, and drove north on 300 West. The signs along 300 West for northbound traffic
were in place and visible, and were the same signs that had been there for northbound traffic since
I first became the South Jordan City Engineer. Attached are color copies of ten photographs
which I understand were taken the day after the accident by a Mr. Callahan of the Federal
Highway Administration, and later turned over to Officer Carruth. I recognize the scene, and the
photographs accurately depict the situation as it would have existed on the night of the accident.
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Photograph 1 is looking northbound, and shows the reverse turn sign. Photograph 2 is looking
northbound, and shows the railroad advance warning sign and the pavement markings, with the
stop sign advance warning sign in the background. Photograph 3 is a similar view, further back.
Photograph 4 shows the advance stop sign warning sign. Photograph 5 is taken just before the
road turns to the right to cross the tracks. Photograph 6 is the same. Photograph 7 shows the stop
sign and crossbuck in place for northbound traffic. Photograph 8 shows a side view of the
crossbuck and stop sign, and the stop bar painted on the pavement roughly even with the stop
sign. Photographs 9 and 10 are views up and down the track from the middle of the crossing.
I have also recently reviewed the deposition of Officer Jack Carruth, who was the South Jordan
police officer who investigated the accident. Officer Carruth testified, and I concur, that the
following signs were in place and visible to northbound traffic on 300 West approaching the
crossing at 10200 South.
6.

The first sign, which is depicted in Exhibit 3 to Officer Carruth's deposition, is a

speed limit sign indicating that the speed limit was 40 miles per hour.
7.

The second sign, Exhibit 4 to Officer Carruth's deposition, was a "reverse turn

sign." Attached hereto is a copy of paragraph 2C-6 of the Manual, referring to the reverse turn
sign. In my opinion, the reverse turn sign on 300 West was appropriate and used in accordance
with the Manual.
8.

The next sign for northbound traffic on 300 West was the railroad advance warning

sign shown in Exhibit 5 to Officer Carruth's deposition. Also shown in that exhibit on the road
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surface just past the sign is the railroad advance warning pavement marking. Attached hereto are
copies of paragraphs 8B-3, 8B-4, and figure 8-2, describing the use of the railroad advance
warning sign and the pavement markings. The pavement markings on the road were consistent
with those recommended in figure 8-2. In my opinion, the railroad advance warning sign and the
railroad advance warning pavement markings were appropriate and used in accordance with the
Manual.
9.

The next sign, which can be seen in the background in Exhibit 5 to Officer

Carruth's deposition, is a "stop ahead sign." Attached hereto is a copy of paragraph 2C-15 of the
Manual, which describes the use of the stop ahead sign. In my opinion, the stop ahead sign was
appropriate and used in accordance with the Manual.
10.

The next signs are located immediately before the road crosses the single railroad

track, and consists of a stop sign and railroad crossing (crossbuck) sign, and are depicted in
Exhibit 6 of Officer Carruth's deposition. Attached is a copy of paragraph 8B-1 of the Manual,
setting forth the purpose of passive traffic control systems, paragraph 8B-2, dealing with railroad
crossing (crossbuck) signs, and figure 8-1 of the Manual, depicting a railroad crossbuck sign. In
my opinion, the railroad crossing crossbuck sign is properly used and its use at this location is
consistent with and, in fact, mandated by the Manual.
11.

Attached hereto are copies of paragraphs 2B-4, 2B-5, and 8B-9, dealing with stop

signs in general, and the use of stop signs at railroad grade crossings. Section 8B-9 of the Manual
requires an engineering study for use of stop signs at grade crossings and, while I am not aware

-4-
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of a specific written engineering study, documents produced in this case make it clear that the
crossing had been the subject of ongoing engineering scrutiny from the Utah Department of
Transportation, the Federal Highway Administration, South Jordan City, and the railroad. See,
for example, the letter from James Nelson of the UDOT to Mayor Theron Hutchings dated
May 21, 1990 (deposition Exhibit 4), memorandum of a surveillance review on June 30, 1992
(deposition Exhibit 6), letter from Mac Christensen to Tony Murphy, South Jordan City Manager,
dated October 20, 1992, reminding that signing and pavement markings are the responsibility of
the City (deposition Exhibit 28), and copy of letter dated October 18, 1995, from James Nelson
of the UDOT to the Southern Pacific Railroad regarding November 16, 1995, coordinating
meeting, with attached agenda, Item 2B of which apparently reflects the status of the crossing as
of the date of the subject accident. In any event, it is my opinion that a stop sign at the railroad
crossing was appropriate under paragraph 8B-9 of the Manual, since 300 West is a secondary road
with low traffic, train traffic is substantial, something in the range of 30 trains per day, traffic was
required to reduce speed because of the road turning to cross the track, and at the stop bar there
would be sufficient sight distance, as required by subparagraph 4. In my opinion, the use of the
stop sign at the location of this crossing is appropriate and consistent with the Manual.
12.

In my opinion, the array of signs available to northbound drivers on the night of

the accident was adequate to identify and direct a driver's attention to the existence and location
of a railroad grade crossing, which is all that a passive traffic control system can accomplish. The
traffic control system in place was consistent with the Manual and complied with traffic
engineering standards generally. A driver being confronted with a railroad crossing crossbuck
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sign and a stop sign at a railroad crossing should stop, look and listen for trains, and not proceed
if a train is approaching.
DATED this f%

day of November,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this \3
' ~;™;
; ;

NOTARY PUBLIC

/£ : ~r%

'-AUR1E G. BECK

. * sf^£]gc\\
2511 South West Temple
\i>[ & A i k U oalt
Lake City, Utah 84115
M
VA ^ 5 ^ - v / y
y Commission Expires
i VKi.^y
June 19,2001
X
^
V
STATE
OF UTAH
My Commission Expires:

0"

day of November, 1998

CLL^A

<;AAo^U

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah

l°i-Ol

N:\13607\322\MC\PLDG.AFF
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
GORDON HAIGHT (Case No. 970903387WD, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah) to be sent, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
David J. Jordan, Esq.
Stoel Rives, L.L.P.
201 South Main Street #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904
Robert A. Schuetze, Esq.
John A. Purvis, Esq.
Purvis, Gray, Schuetze & Gordon
1050 Walnut Street, Suite 501
Boulder, Colorado 80302

E. Scott Savage, Esq.
Casey K. McGarvey, Esq.
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic & Savage
Attorneys for Railroad Defendants
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Carrie Hale
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RDWY:[RDWJCN]Y.2;6
June 30f 1992
A Surveillance Review was held at 10200 South and 3rd West in South
Jordan at the D&RGW Railroad Crossing.
Location: 10200 South 300 West in South Jordan
AAR Railroad Crossing No, 254344R
The following were in attendences
Orlando Meira
D&RGW Railroad
Dik Laubsch
FHWA
Eric Cheng
UDOT, Safety
Lillian Witkowski
UDOT, Safety
James C Nelson *
UDOT, Util. & RR
Michael V Arambula UDOT, Util. Engn.
Anthony Murphy
South Jordan
Dan Christensen
Developer
Mark Wilson
Developer
The following items were discussed:
Reviewed the history of the existing 10200 South crossing and the
various designs that have been done at the location.
South Jordan's City Manager, Anthony Murphy, presented a new
proposal that is part of South Jordan's Master Plan. The City plans
on building a new road west of and parallel to the railroad tracks
from 106th South to 94th South. The new road will tie into a Sandy
City's road which connects to 90th South. This new road will
provide access to the properties west of the tracks and eliminate
several private railroad crossings. Then the road east of the
railroad tracks that currently crosses the railraod tracks at 10200
South will be extended on to the south to about 104th South on the
east of the tracks and then it will cross the railroad at 90
degeees on a new railroad crossing at approximately Railroad mile
post 7 31. When this new crossing is complete, the city will close
the existing access across the railroad tracks at 10200 South,
which has a very bad crossing angle and poor sight distance. •
It was also noted that South Jordan is working with UDOT and
eventually plans to build a railroad underpass for 106th South
which will eliminate the existing at-grade crossing on 106th South.
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South Jordan City will start presenting their master plan to
concerned groups and work with the developers to get the plan
implemented. South JordanxCity will select a loction for the 104th
South crossing of the tracks and notify UDOT when they wil^be
ready to hold a Railroad Surveillance Review.
Once the surveillance review has been held UDOT will prepare a
matching fund agreement between UDOT and D&RGW RR and South Jordan -i
City for the 6.75% matching fund cost. After the Matching Fund.
Agreement is complete, UDOT will prepare an agreement with .the
railroad for the design and installation of Automatic Flashing
Light Signals and Gates.
At a future date, the City in conjunction with UDOT will develope
a grade separation for the railroad overpassing 106th South.
All attending the meeting agreed to the proposed plan.
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

samuti J. Tavlor

Norman H. Bangerter

«.h airman
w
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* y n t :>. W i n t e r s

jene H. Findlav. C.P.A.

V**t Chairman

£xtcuiiv« Oirtcter

R. Lavaun Cox
Todd C. Weston
•James G. Larkm
Elvt H. Anderson

J«ne aturzeneager. ?.£.
A M H S U M Director

•Sheldon McConkie
0i5tn« Director

May 21, 1990

Mayor Theron B. Hutchings
City of South Jordan
11175 South Redwood Road
South Jordan,-Utah
84065
Attention:

Richard N. Varne, City Administrator

Dear Mayor Hutchings,
SUBJECT:

Railroad Grade Crossing Diagnostic Review of the D&RG
Railroad Crossing No. 254-344R at approximately 10200
South and 3rd West in South Jordan City

In accordance with Utah Department of Transportation Policy
and Procedure, it was determined'that the railroad crossing noted
above and shown on the attached map be evaluated by the UD0T
Railroad Grade Crossing Diagnostic Review Team.
Representatives from South Jordan, UDOT and the Federal
Highway Administration met at the site on April 11, 1990 to
discuss the project concept. From this meeting, two options were
recommended:
1, To leave the existing crossing in place on the current
alignment and simply install new signals, gates and barriers on
the east s ide, or
2. To combine two crossings at location on 10000 South and
continue the frontage .road through 10200 South to 10000 South.
Combining the two crossings would be a benefit to South
Jordan City but would require a substantial investment. The
approximate cost of such a project, not including right of way
and environmental clearances, would be $300,000. South Jordan
City's participating share at ten percent would be $30,000. The
City would also need to secure right of way and environmental
clearances.
^TEPOS!T!ON

EXHIBIT

in eouai oooot iwwv tfrrwov*
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C i t y of
May 2 1 ,
Page 2

South
L990

Jordan

To l e a v e t h e e x i s t i n g
w o u l d n e e d t o be i n s t a l l e d

c r o s s i n g in p l a c e the f o l l o w i n g
a t the r a i l r o a d c r o s s i n g :

items

1.

Flashing Light

Signats

2.

Automatic

3.

Install barrier (80 feet) on the outside of the curve
east of the track and adjacent to 1-15.

4.

Install railroad advance warning signs and relocate
stop signs, and crossbucks.

Cates

Since- 10200 South at 300 West is a City Street, South Jordan
City..will be 'responsible to install the railroad advance warning
signs and relocate the stop signs, crossbucks and install the 80
feet of barrier.
Before UDOT can proceed to authorize funding for the
automatic gates and flashing light signals at the crossing, a
lecter of commitment is required from South Jordan City agreeing
to participate in the project with ten percent matching funds to
cover part of the installation cost and to provide the above
noted items on the City streets.
The estimated cost of the project will be about $130,000.
South Jordan City's participating share will be about $13,000.
The final agreement will reflect the actual cost.
UDOT assumes that South Jordan City has decided to leave che
existing crossing intact at 10200 South since we have not been
contacted about the new alignment or about a commitment tc obtain
right of way. To avoid any further delays and risks regarding
liability for accidents at the crossing, we encourage che City's
commitment to participate in the automatic gates and flashing
light signals.
UDOT will proceed to prepare a Design Study Report and
request approval for preliminary engineering from the Federal
Highway Administration for the Railroad to prepare detail plans
and estimates for the railroad force account work. After
approval is received and plans are prepared by che Railroad, UDOT
will* prepare formal agreements wjlth the Railroad Company for
installing the flashing light signals and automatic gates. Also,
we will prepare a cooperative agreement with South Jordan City
for deposit of matching funds. The railroad agreement will Chen
be submitted to the Federal Highway Administration requesting
authorization to proceed with the work.
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Cicv of Souch Jordan
Hay - 21. 1990
Page 3
Afcer UDOT receives auchorizacion co proceed wich che work
from che FHWA, che railroad agreemenc will be submicced co che
Railroad Company and che matching fund agreemenc will be
submicced co che Cicy of Souch-Jordan co be executed. UDOT looks
forward co working wich che Cicy co improve chis railroad
crossing. If you have any questions, please concacc my office ac
any cime (801) 965-4176.
Very cruly yours,

James C. Nelson, P. E.
Engineering Coordinacor

Attachments
JCN/SVJ/gj
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
N o r m a n H. Bangerter
Governor
E u g e n e H. Findlay, GRA.
Execuove Dinxwr
toward H. Richardson. RE.
.Assistant Otrecur

^501 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City. Utah 84119-5998
'801) 965-4000

TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION
•Samuei J. Taylor
Chairman
Wayne 6. Winters
Vice Chairman
Todd C. Weston
•James G. Larkin
John T. Dunlop
Elva H. Anderson
Secretary

October 20, 1992

City of South..Jordan
Anthony Murphy
11175 So. Redwood Road
South Jordan, Utah
84065
Dear Mr. Murphy,
Reference is made our review of the railroad grade crossing at 10200 South,
South Jordan.
"t has been noted that the railroad grade crossing requires Advance Warning
^igns and pavement markings to be installed. Please be advised that all
signing and pavement markings are the responsibility of the local authority
and should be installed prior to relocation of the crossing, and this office
should be notified upon completion.
After completion of the Federally funded project the signs should be moved to
the new location at approximately 10500 South and the existing old crossing
will be closed.
Thank you for your interest in safety.
Sincerely,

Mack 0. Christensen
Traffic & Safety Studies Engineer

MOC/LWitkowski/cdf
cc:

Jim Nelson
Mike Arambula
Eric Cheng
Dick Laubsch, FHWA
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be:

Clair L. Hendrickson, FHWA
Orlando Miera, Field Engineer, SPTC
Michael V. Arambula, Roadway Design
Gerald Bartschi, Roadway Design
Bob Charlesworth, Region 2
Lillian Witkowski, Safety
Steve Reitz, Internal Audit

October 18, 1995

Mr, Bob N. Price, Manager Public Services
Southern Pacific Transportation Company
1200 Corporate Center Drive
Monterey Park, California 91754-7605
SUBJECT:

November 16, 1995 Coordinating Meeting

Dear Bob:
The next meeting between the Utah Department of Transportation
and the South Pacific Transportation Company is scheduled for
November 16, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. in the UDOT*Complex in the 4th Floor
Roadway Design Conference Room, at 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah,
Attached is a copy of the Agenda and Railroad Status Report
for the next meeting to be held on November 16, 1995. We look
forward to meeting with you.
Sincerely yours,
James C. Nelson, P. E.
Engineering Coordinator,
Utilities and Railroads

J:\WPFILES\RRCMTG\D&RGW\111695
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October 18, 1995

Mr. Bob N. Price, Manager Public Services
Southern Pacific Transportation Company
1200 Corporate Center Drive
Monterey Park, 'California 91754-7605
SUBJECT:

November 16# 1995 Coordinating Meeting

Dear Bob:
The next meeting between the Utah Department of Transportation
and the South Pacific Transportation Company is scheduled for
November 16, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. in the UDOT Complex in the 4th Floor
Roadway Design Conference Room, at 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
Attached is a copy of the Agenda and Railroad Status Report
for the next meeting to be held on November 16, 1995. We look
forward to meeting with you.
Sincerely yours,
James C. Nelson, P. E.
Engineering Coordinator,
Utilities and Railroads
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AGENDA
Review the 1994 Projects.
1994 Projects
A.

AAR 254630W, RRP-LC35(84), 9th South 650 West
in Salt Lake City.
Will install the Constant Warning Device on
August 14# 1995.

B.

AAR 254773U, RRP-STP-LC35(92), 4800 South 180
West in Murray.
SPTC reported they are waiting for the control
panel. It will be here in a few weeks and
should be installed in late September, 1995.
What is the current status.

C.

AAR 254900T, STP-LC49 (15) , 6400 North 5000
West in Am-Fk.
SPTC has been authorized to proceed with the
construction of the crossing. SPTC reported
the material has been ordered.
What is the current Status.

D

AAR 254905C, RRP-STP-LC49 (14) ,'* 4th South East
of SR-114, near Orem.
The crossing material and signal
equipment was installed on May 17,
1995.
A
Final
inspection was
scheduled for August 8, 1995.
What is the current status.

Review the list of proposed projects scheduled for 1995
and 1997.
1995 Design Project's
A.

AAR 254340N, STP-007K )2, T2300 South 500
West on Draper Road in Riverton.
Plans were sent to SPTC authorizing them to *
proceed with the preparation of their plans
and estimate. SPTC reported the plans and
estimate will be sent to UDOT in Two
weeks(August 18, 1995).
What is the current status.
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AAR 254344R, STP-LC35(76) , 10200 South 300
West in South Jordan.
The I-15/Railroad Study is complete. An
overpass will be placed at 106th South. When
the new railroad Grade and the 106th South
overpass is complete, an AT-Grade Crossing
will be placed at about 104th or 105th south
and the 10200 South crossing will be Closed.
Until then, this project is on hold.
Any update on the status of the project.
AAR 254347L, STP-0209(8)7, 90th South .1-15.
A Surveillance Review was held on May 11,
1993. Since that time an I-15/Railroad Study
has been completed. The I-15/Railroad Study
has determined a railroad underpass will be
constructed at 90th South to replace the AtGrade Crossing.
A supplemental surveillance was held at the
90th South At-Grade Crossing because there
have been a number of crashes that have
resulted in a death and a number of injuries.
The accidents are being caused from traffic
backing up at the Traffic Signals to the east
and west of the crossing and motorists are
being trapped on the crossing with no way to
get off the tracks. It was decided to do an
interim project and preempt the traffic
signals so the tracks can. be cleared before
the trains come. SPTC has submitted the design
for the Preemption system. The agreement is
complete and the "Notice of Intended Action
has been advertised.
What is the current status.
AAR 254742V, STP-LC49 ( ), 5400 South 1700 East
in Springville. •
A Surveillance Review was held on
May 10, 1993. A Surveillance Report
was issued on June 27, 1993. No
further action will be taken at this
time. Any change in stattfs.
AAR 254760T, STP-LC49 ( ), 5400 South 1600 East
in Springville.
A Surveillance Review was held on May 10,
1993. A Surveillance Report was issued on June
27, 1993. No other action required at this
time.
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recommended speed on a turn to be 30 MPH or less, and this
recommended speed is equal to or less than the speed limit established by
law or by regulation for that section of highway. Where a Turn sign is
warranted, a Large Arrow sign (sec. 2C-9) may be used on the outside of
the turn. Additional protection may be provided by use of the Advisory
Speed plate (sec. 2C-35).

W1-1R
30"x 30"

c

W1-2R
30"x 30"

2C-5 Curve Sign (Wl-2)
The Curve sign (W1-2R or 2L) may be used where engineering
investigations of roadway, geometric, and operating conditions show the
recommended speed on the curve to be greater than 30 miles per hour and
equal to or less than the speed limit established by law or by regulation for
that section of highway. Additional protection may be provided by use of
the Advisory Speed plate (sec. 2C-35).

Editorial
Change
Rev. 4

2C-6 Reverse Turn Sign (Wl-3)
The Reverse Turn sign is intended for use to mark two turns or a curve l Editorial
and a turn in opposite directions as defined in the warrants for Turn and I ^ " A *
Curve signs (sees. 2C-4 and 5) that are separated by a tangent of less than
600 feet. If the first turn is to the right, a Right Reverse Turn sign(W 1-3R)
shall be used and if the first turn is to the left, a Left Reverse Turn sign
(W1-3L) shall be used.

c

W1-4R
30"x 30"

W1-3R
30"x 30"

2C-3
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8B-3 Railroad Advance Warning Signs (W10-1, 2, 3, 4)
A Railroad Advance Warning (W10-1) sign shall be used on each roadway in advance of every grade crossing except:
1. On low-volume, low-speed roadways crossing minor spurs or other
tracks that are infrequently used and which are flagged by train crews.
2. In the business districts of urban areas where active grade crossing
traffic control devices are in use.
3. Where physical conditions do not permit even a partially effective
display of the sign.
Placement of the sign shall be in accordance with Table II-1, Section
2C-3 and Sections 2A-21 to 2A-27, except in residential or business
districts where low speeds are prevalent, the signs may be placed a
minimum distance of 100 feet from the crossing. On divided highways and
one-way roads, it is desirable to erect an additional sign on the left side of
the roadway.
The W10-2, 3, and 4 signs may be installed on highways that are parallel
to railroads. The purpose of these signs is to warn a motorist making a
turn that a railroad crossing is ahead. Where there is 100 feet or more
between the railroad and the parallel highway, a W10-1 sign should be installed in advance of the railroad crossing and the W10-2, 3, or 4 signs on
the parallel highway would not be necessary.

Vlll-12(c)
Rev. 5

(

W10-1
36" Diameter

VIII-2 (c)
Rev. 2

(.

W10-2

W10-3

W10-4

30" x 30"

30" x 30"

30" x 30"

8B-3
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8B-4 Pavement Markings
Pavement markings in advance of a grade crossing shall consist of an X,
the letters RR, a no passing marking (2-lane roads), and certain transverse
lines. Identical markings shall be placed in each approach lane on all
paved approaches to grade crossings where grade crossing signals or
automatic gates are located, and at all other grade crossings where the
prevailing speed of highway traffic is 40 mph or greater. When used, a
portion of the pavement marking symbol should be directly opposite the
advance warning sign. If needed, supplemental pavement marking symbol^) may be placed between the advance warning sign and the crossing.
The markings shall also be placed at crossings where the engineering
studies indicate there is a significant potential conflict between vehicles
and trains. At minor crossings or in urban areas, these markings may be
omitted if engineering study indicates that other devices installed provide
suitable control.
The design of railroad crossing pavement markings shall be essentially
as illustrated in figure 8-2. The symbols and letters are elongated to allow
for the low angle at which they are viewed. All markings shall be
reflectorized white except for the no-passing markings which shall be
reflectorized yellow.
8B-5 Illumination at Grade Crossings
At grade crossings where a substantial amount of railroad operation is
conducted at night, particularly where train speeds are low, where crossings are blocked for long periods, or accident history indicates that
motorists experience difficulty in seeing trains or control devices during
the hours of darkness, illumination at and adjacent to the crossing may be
installed to supplement other traffic control devices where an engineering
analysis determines that better visibility of the train is needed. Regardless
of the presence of other control devices, illumination will aid the motorist
in observing the presence of railroad cars on a crossing where the gradient
of the vehicular approaches is such that the headlights of an oncoming
vehicle shine under or over the cars.
Recommended types and location of luminaires for grade crossing
illumination are contained in the American National Standard Practice for
Roadway Lighting, RP8.* In any event, luminaires shall be so located and
light therefrom so directed as to not interfere with aspects of the railroad
signal system and not interfere with the field of view of members of the
locomotive crew.
8B-6 Exempt Crossing Signs (R15-3, WlO-la)
When authorized by law or regulation a supplemental sign (R15-3)
bearing the word EXEMPT may be used below the Crossbuck and Track
• Available from the Illuminating Engineering Society, New York, N.Y. 10017.

8B-5
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Stop line approximately 8*
from gate (if present)

09
CD

Width may vary according to lane width.

t When used, a portion of the
pavement marking symbol should be
directly opposite the Advance
Warning Sign (W10-1). If needed,
supplemental pavement marking
symbol(s) may be placed .between the
Advance Warning Sign and the
crossing, but should be at least 50
feet from the Stop Line.

Figure 8-2.

A three lane roadway should be marked with a
centerline for two-lane approach operation on
the approach to a crossing.
On multi-lane roads the transverse bands
should extend across all approach lanos, and
individual RXR symbols should be used in
each approach lane.
Refer to Standard Alphabet for Highway Signs
and Markings for RXR symbols details.

Typical placement of warning signs and pavement markings at railroad-highway grade crossings.

r

**\

**.^:.

V

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2C-15 Stop Ahead Sign (W3-1)
A STOP AHEAD sign is intended for use on an approach to a STOP
sign that is not visible for a sufficient distance to permit the driver to bring
his vehicle to a stop at the STOP sign. Obstruction(s) causing the limited
visibility may be permanent or intermittent.
The STOP AHEAD sign shall be a minimum of 30 X 30 inches.
In some cases, it may be used for emphasis where there is poor
observance of the STOP sign.
The word message STOP AHEAD sign (W3-1) may be used as an
alternate to the symbol sign (W3-la).

W3-1a
36"x 36"

W3-2a
36"x

36"

W3-3
36"x 36"

c

2C-16 Yield Ahead Sign (W3-2)
A YIELD AHEAD sign is intended for use on an approach to a YIELD
sign that is not visible for a sufficient distance to permit the driver to bring
his vehicle to a stop at the YIELD sign. Obstruction(s) causing the limited
visibility may be permanent or intermittent.
The YIELD AHEAD sign shall be a minimum of 30 x 30 inches.
The word message YIELD AHEAD sign (W3-2) may be used as an
alternate to the symbol sign (W3-2a).

2C-17 Signal Ahead Sign (W3-3)
A Signal Ahead sign is intended for use in advance of any signalized
location where physical conditions prevent drivers from having a
continuous view of at least two signal indications for distance specified in
section 4B-12.
II-85 (c)
Rev. 5

2C-8
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B. SIGNS AND MARKINGS
8B-1 Purpose
Passive traffic control systems, consisting of signs, pavement markings,
and grade crossing illumination, identify and direct attention to the
location of a grade crossing. They permit vehicle operators and
pedestrians to take appropriate action.
Where railroad tracks have been abandoned or their use discontinued,
all related signs and markings shall be removed. A sign, TRACKS OUT
OF SERVICE (R8-9) may be installed until the tracks are removed or
covered (see Section 8B-10).
8B-2 Railroad Crossing (Crossbuck) Sign (R15-1, 2)
The railroad crossing sign, a regulatory sign, commonly identified as the
"crossbuck" sign, as a minimum shall be white reflectorized sheeting or
equal, with the words RAILROAD CROSSING in black lettering. As a
minimum, one crossbuck sign shall be used on each roadway approach to
every grade crossing, alone or in combination with other traffic control
devices. If there are two or more tracks between the signs, the number of
tracks shall be indicated on an auxiliary sign of inverted T shape mounted
below the crossbuck in the manner and at the heights indicated in figure
8-1 except that use of this auxiliary sign is optional at crossings with
automatic gates.
Where physically feasible and visible to approaching traffic the
crossbuck sign shall be installed on the right hand side of the roadway on
each approach to the crossing. Where an engineering study finds restricted
sight distance or unfavorable road geometry, crossbuck signs shall be
placed back to back or otherwise located so that two faces are displayed to
that approach.
Crossbuck signs should be located with respect to the roadway
pavement or shoulder in accordance with the criteria in sections 2A-21
through 2A-27 and figures 2-1 and 2-2 (pages 2A-9 and 2A-10) and
should be located with respect to the nearest track in accordance with
signal locations in figure 8-7, (page 8C-6). The normal lateral clearances
(sec. 2A-24), 6 feet from the edge of the highway shoulder or 12 feet from
the edge of the traveled way in rural areas and 2 feet from the face of the
curb in urban areas will usually be attainable. Where unusual conditions
demand, variations determined by good judgment should provide the best
possible combination of view and safety clearances attainable,
occasionally utilizing a location on the left-hand side of the roadway.
Appropriate details of R15-1 and R15-2 are available in Standard
Highway Signs. *
* Available from GPO
8B-1
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TRACKS
M5-1

R15-2

48" x 9"

9" x 9"

(drilled for 90-degree mounting)

27" x 9"

C

* HEIGHT MAY BE VARIED
AS REQUIRED BY LOCAL
CONDITIONS.

-ROADWAY LEVEL
Figurw 8-1.

Railroad-highway

crossing (crottbuck) sign.

8B-2
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STOP
R1-1
30"x 30"

4-WAYMALL WAY|
Rl-3
12"x6"

R1-4
18"x6"

2B-4 Stop Sign (Rl-1)
STOP signs are intended for use where traffic is required to stop. The
STOP sign shall be an octagon with white message and border on a red
background. The standard size shall be 30 x 30 inches. Where greater
emphasis or visibility is required, a larger size is recommended. On lowvolume local streets and secondary roads with low approach speeds, a 24
x 24 inch size may be used.
At a multiway stop intersection (sec. 2B-6), a supplementary plate
(Rl-3) should be mounted just below each STOP sign. If the number of
approach legs to the intersection is three or more, the numeral on the
supplementary plate shall correspond to the actual number of legs, or the
legend ALL-WAY (Rl-4) may be used. The supplementary plate shall
have white letters on a red background and shall have a standard size of 12
x 6 inches (Rl-3) or 18 x 6 inches (Rl-4).
A STOP sign beacon or beacons may be used in conjunction with a
STOP sign as described in section 4E-4.
Secondary messages shall not be used on STOP sign faces.

c

2B-5 Warrants for Stop Sign
Because the STOP sign causes a substantial inconvenience to motorists,
it should be used only where warranted. A STOP sign may be warranted at
an intersection where one or more of the following conditions exist:
.1. Intersection of a less important road with a main road where
application of the normal right-of-way rule is unduly hazardous.
2. Street entering a through highway or street.
3. Unsignalized intersection in a signalized area.
4. Other intersections where a combination of high speed, restricted
view, and serious accident record indicates a need for control by the STOP
sign.
Prior to the application of these warrants, consideration should be given I
to less restrictive measures, such as the YIELD sign (2B-7) where a full I
Rev. 9/84 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
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stop is not necessary at all times. Periodic reviews of existing installations
may be desirable to determine whether, because of changed conditions,
the use of less restrictive control or no control could accommodate traffic
demands safely and more effectively.
STOP signs should never be used on the through roadways of
expressways. Properly designed expressway interchanges provide for the
continuous flow of traffic, making STOP signs unnessary even on the
entering roadways. Where at-grade intersections are temporarily justified
for local traffic in sparsely populated areas, STOP signs should be used on
the entering roadways to protect the through traffic. STOP signs may also
be required at the end of diverging roadways at the intersection with other
highways not designed as expressways. In most of these cases, the speeds
will not warrant any great increase in the sign sizes.
STOP signs shall not be erected at intersections where traffic control
signals are operating. The conflicting commands of two types of control
devices are confusing. If traffic is required to stop when the operation of
the stop-and-go signals is not warranted, the signals should be put on
flashing operation with the red flashing light facing the traffic that must
stop.
Where two main highways intersect, the STOP sign or signs should
normally be posted on the minor street to stop the lesser flow of traffic.
Traffic engineering studies, however, may justify a decision to install a
STOP sign or signs on the major street, as at a three-way intersection
where safety considerations may justify stopping the greater flow of
traffic to permit a left-turning movement.
STOP signs may be used at selected railroad-highway grade crossings
only after their need has been determined by a detailed traffic engineering
study. Use of the STOP sign at railroad-highway grade crossings is
described in Section 8B-9.
Portable or part-time STOP signs shall not be used except for
emergency purposes. Also, STOP signs should not be used for speed
control.
2B-6 Multiway Stop Signs
The "Multiway Stop" installation is useful as a safety measure at some
locations. It should ordinarily be used only where the volume of traffic on
the intersecting roads is approximately equal. A traffic control signal is
more satisfactory for an intersection with a heavy volume of traffic.
Any of the following conditions may warrant a multiway STOP sign
installation (sec. 2B-4):
1. Where traffic signals are warranted and urgently needed, the
multiway stop is an interim measure that can be installed quickly to
control traffic while arrangements are being made for the signal
installation.
2B-3
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the road on the near or far side of the grade crossing, whichever provides
better visibility to the motorist to observe the sign and be able to comply
with its message. On multi-lane roads and one-way roadways a second sign
may be placed on the near or far left side to the grade crossing to further
improve visibility. Placement of the R8-8 sign(s) should be determined as
part of the engineering study.
8B-9 STOP Signs at Grade Crossings (Rl-1, W3-1)
The use of the STOP signs at railroad-highway grade crossings shall be
limited to those grade crossings selected after need is established by a
detailed traffic engineering study. Such crossings should have the following characteristics:
1. Highway should be secondary in character with low traffic counts.
2. Train traffic should be substantial.
3. Line of sight to an approaching train is restricted by physical
features such that approaching traffic is required to reduce speed to 10
miles per hour or less in order to stop safely.
4. At the stop bar, there must be sufficient sight distance down the
track to afford ample time for a vehicle to cross the track before the
arrival of the train.

c

VIII-11 (c)
Rev. 5

VIII-5 (c)
Rev. 2

The engineering study may determine other compelling reasons for the
need to install a STOP sign, however, this should only be an interim
measure until active traffic control signals can be installed. STOP signs
shall not be used on primary through highways or at grade crossings with
active traffic control devices.
Whenever a STOP sign is installed at a grade crossing, a Stop Ahead
sign shall be installed in advance of the STOP sign.
8B-10 Tracks Out of Service Sign (R8-9)
The TRACKS OUT OF SERVICE sign (R8-9) is intended for use at a
crossing in lieu of the Railroad Crossing sign (R15-1, 2) when a railroad
track has been abandoned or its use discontinued. This sign (R8-9) shall be
removed when the tracks have been removed or covered.

c

R8-9
24" x 24*

8B-7
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May 21, 1990

Mayor Theron B. Hutchings
City of South Jordan
11175 South Redwood Road
South Jordan, Utah 84065
Attention:

Richard N. tfarne, City Administrator

Dear Mayor Hutchings,
SUBJECT:

Railroad Grade Crossing Diagnostic Review of the D&RG
Railroad Crossing No. 254-344R at approximately 10200
South and 3rd West in South Jordan City

In accordance with Utah Department of Transportation Policy
and Procedure, it was determined * that the railroad crossing noted
above and shown on the attached map be evaluated by the UDOT
Railroad Grade Crossing Diagnostic Review Team.
Representatives from South Jordan, UDOT and the Federal
Highway Administration met at the site on April 11, 1990 to
discuss the project concept. From this meeting, two options were
recommended:
1. To leave the existing crossing in place on the current
alignment and simply install new signals, gates and barriers on
the east s ide, or
2. To combine two crossings at location on 10000 South and
continue the frontage road through 10200 South to 10000 South.
Combining the two crossings would be a benefit to South
Jordan City but would require a substantial investment. The
approximate cost of such a project, not including right of way
and environmental clearances, would be $300,000. South Jordan
City's participating share at ten percent would be $30,000. The
City would also need to secure right of way and environmental
clearances.
^TSSsffloN
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City of South Jordan
May 21, L990
Page 2
To leave the existing crossing in place the following items
would need to be installed at the railroad crossing:
1.

Flashing Light

Signats

2.

Automatic

3.

Install barrier (80 feet) on the outside of the curve
east of the track and adjacent to 1-15.

4.

Install railroad advance warning signs and relocate
stop signs, and crossbucks.

Gates

Since 10200 South at 300 West is a City Street, South Jordan
City..will be responsible to install the railroad advance warning
signs and relocate the stop signs, crossbucks and install the 80
feet of barrier.
Before UDOT can proceed to authorize funding for the
automatic gates and flashing light signals at the crossing, a
letter of commitment is required from South Jordan City agreeing
to participate in the project with ten percent matching funds co
cover part of the installation cost and to provide the above
noted items on the City streets.
The estimated cost of the project will be about $130,000.
South Jordan City's participating share will be about $13,000.
The final agreement will reflect the actual cost.
UDOT assumes that South Jordan City has decided to leave the
existing crossing intact at 10200 South since we have not been
contacted about the new alignment or about a commitment to obtain
right of way. To avoid any further delays and risks regarding
liability for accidents at the crossing, we encourage the City's
commitment to participate in the automatic gates and flashing
light signals.
UDOT will proceed to prepare a Design Study Report and
request approval for preliminary engineering from the Federal
Highway Administration for the Railroad to prepare detail plans
and estimates for the railroad force account work. After
approval is received and plans are prepared by the Railroad, UDOT
will prepare formal agreements with the Railroad Company for
installing the flashing light signals and automatic gates. Also,
we will prepare a cooperative agreement with South Jordan City
for deposit of matching funds. The railroad agreement will Chen
be submitted to the Federal Highway Administration requesting
authorization co proceed with the work.
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Very truly yours,

James C. Nelson, P. E.
Engineering Coordinator
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RDWY:[RDWJCN]Y.2;4
April 13, 1992
Location: South Jordan City Offices
11175 So- Redwood Road
South Jordan City, Utah
Subject Ref: 10200 So & D&RGW

Railroad Crossing

The following were in attendence:
Anthony Murphy
Orlando Miera
Donald W. Killmore
Tom Smith
Eric Cheng
Michael V Arambula
James C Nelson

So. Jordan City Administrater
254-3742
Southern Pacific Trans. Co.
974-9253
Area Engineer, FHWA
524-5142
Asst. Dist Two Director
975-4806
Traffic Engineer, Safety
975-4284
Railroad and Utilities
965-4813
Engineering
Coordinator
Util & of
RR years
965-4176
A brief discussion was
given regarding
the number
South
Jordan City and UDOT have tried to get the railroad crossing at
10200 South across the D&RGW Railroad tracks improved with
Automatic Flashing Light Signals and Gates.
South Jordan City has now come up with a New Master Road Plan for
the area which if approved would change the concept for the
proposed railroad crossing at 10200 South.
Tony Murphy, South Jordan's City Administrator reviewed the master
plan which calls for the consolidation of two private railroad
crossings at 98th and 100th South into one private crossing near
100th South. The highway/railway crossing at 10200 South would be
deleted and a new crossing placed at about 104th South.
The crossing at 104th South would only serve local industrial
properties and would not serve as a local frontage road. A new
frontage road would be delveloped west of the railroad tracks and
it would act as a frontage road between 90th South and 106th South
and would provide access to the properties that had access over the
railroad tracks. The frontage road east of the tracks that crossed
the tracks at 10200 South would have the railroad crossing closed
and the frontage road would be extended south to provide access to
about 104th south for the industrial area and then cross the .D&RGW
Tracks at about 104th South.
UDOT will work with South Jordan City to develope a grade
intersection on 106th South for South Jordan City's newly proposed
north south road west of the tracks connecting 106th So. and 90th
South. South Jordan City is to contact John Maurer at UDOT's
District two offices to coordinate the new intersection design.
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South Jordan City will start presenting their master plan to
concerned groups and work with the developers to get the plan
implemented. South Jordan^City will select a loction for the 104th
South crossing of the tracks and notify UDOT when they wilj.^be
ready to hold a Railroad Surveillance Review.
Once the surveillance review has been held UDOT will prepare a
matching fund agreement between UDOT and D&RGW RR and South Jordan
City for the 6.75% matching fund cost. After the Matching Fund
Agreement is complete, UDOT will prepare an agreement with .the
railroad for the design and installation of Automatic Flashing
Light Signals and Gates.
At a future date, the City in conjunction with UDOT will develope
a grade separation for the railroad overpassing 106th South.
All attending the meeting agreed to the proposed plan.
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ie 30, 1992
Surveillance Review was held at 10200 South and 3rd West in South
cdan at the DSRGW Railroad Crossing•
cation: 10200 South 300 West in South Jordan
AAR Railroad Crossing No. 254344R
e following were in attendence:
D&RGW Railroad
FHWA
UDOT, Safety
UDOT, Safety
UDOT, Util. & RR
UDOT, Util. Engn,
South Jordan
Developer
Developer
Le following items were discussed:
lando Meira
k Laubsch
ic Cheng
llian Witkowski
mes C Nelson
chael V Arambula
>thony Murphy
JI Christensen
irk Wilson

^viewed the history of the existing 10200 South crossing and the
irious designs that have been done at the location.
Duth Jordan's City Manager, Anthony Murphy, presented a new
coposal that is part of South Jordan's Master Plan. The City plans
i building a new road west of and parallel to the railroad tracks
rom 106th South to 94th South. The new road will tie into a Sandy
Lty's road which connects to 90th South. This new road will
rovide access to the properties west of the tracks and eliminate
everal private railroad crossings. Then the road east of the
ailroad tracks that currently crosses the railraod tracks at 10200
outh will be extended on to the south to about 104th South on the
ast of the tracks and then it will cross the railroad at 90
egeees on a new railroad crossing at approximately Railroad mile
ost 731. When this new crossing is complete, the city will close
he existing access across the railroad tracks at 10200 South,
r
hich has a very bad crossing angle and poor sight distance. ;t was also noted that South Jordan is working with UDOT and
eventually plans to build a railroad underpass for 106th South
rhich will eliminate the existing at-grade crossing on 106th South.

i

JUL OS 1992
IranspMtatwn
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The following items were agreed to by FHWAf UDOT and South Jordan•
1.
The road extention east of the railroad tracks at 10200 South
to the new railroad crossing at about 10400 South and then on west
across the tracks to South Jordan's newly proposed north-south road
will be built by South Jordan and their developers.
2.
Federal Railroad Safety Funds will be used to provide
Automatic Flashing Light Signals, Gates, Constant Motion Detection
and new rubber crossing materials.
3.
South Jordan will place passive warning devices at the
existing 10200 South crossing and will then move them to the new
crossing at 10400 South when they close the existing crossing.
4.
South Jordan City will provide UDOT with a letter agreeing to
participate in the project with the 6.67% matching funds and agree
to have the new road built by the time the new railroad active
warning devices are in place at the new crossing.
5.
The D&RGW Railroad agreed to have the new crossing nine (9)
months after they are authorized to proceed with the construction
of the project at approximately Railroad M.P. 731.
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July 28, 1992

UDOT/DPS Building, Fourth.Floor
! Attn: James C. Nelson, P.E.
4501 South 2700 West
SLC,UT 84119 f
;
;. * '"

'RE: -10200 Railroad Crossing

'"

Dear Mr. Nelson:

-:

'•/.

This letter is interided to serve as a'confirmation of my understanding regarding
plans to correct the dangerous railroad crossing at 10200 South in South Jordan
city.

, ; - . . ; } , J . . H . . : • ' i v ; . - • • • ; • • . • • • ; : • . : - : . - . . - • -•'.'••.:.:•

•" •

'-••

V~.v-i-~5-i- V.---

-

It is South Jordan Cityjs desire to eventually vacate the crossing at 10200 SoutlL"!. ; v . *".
A public hearing has been scheduled for August 25', 1992 to_ac<J^t'j^bIic.\T>j;ii«-.:
comment on a revision to the master street plan for'a'new frontage road in t n e ^ l ^ g R '
j area at approximately 400 br'500 West. The road will tie'into 500 West m ^ ^ j ^ ^ f
-Sandy City" and reduce the need for rail crossings in. the area. Afthis time"! ^:sMfe^
can't commit to an exact time table for construction of the new frontage road but ^S>t5ft r
I expect it to be completed in phases over the next five years;' .. ; . : • ^ p § ^ S t ^ "
The City has also coordinated with UDOT to include an underpass for 10600 . ? ; ^ ^
South to eliminate anticipated congestion problems at the 10600 South, • :i£;k:::\interchange. It is my understanding that-the underpass jvill beincluded on tfie ^.£?V3?-v; vupcoming five-year plan. The underpass is critical to avoid problems sinuiarXcT '""^'-:;':.
9000 South at this intersection.' •' ••':- * : .\ • ,:"; """">: :- " "*. '-'.'-' ' ^ ^ R ? f " r: v : '
The construction of the underpass and the new frontage roatf-willmake it ''/*
possible to eventually vacate "the. 10200 Southland other private crossings over ••:..<.,
the railroad. The City has proposed a new rail crossing at approximately 10500 . " • ;.
::w

SOUTH TORDAN

111TC C ^ . — . O
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10200 South Rail Crossing
July 28, 1992
.• '
Page 2
,' • . •
South to provide, access to property east of the railroad and to. extend a minor
frontage road to tie into the existing frontage road east of the railroad at
approximately 10200 South. Access to the property east of the railroad from *
10600 South may be closed in five years and it is important for the City to move
ahead on this project. I have discussed the proposed Crossing with all but one
of the affected property owners and there does not appear to be any opposition. •
to the proposal.
.'•. . . .
. . .
I understand that the City will need to pay for a portion of the costs of the new
crossing. I believe that the City is 'responsible for paying approximately 6
percent of the total costs. The participation level is acceptable to the City.'. *
Obviously a project of.this nature will take, some time to put together. I
appreciate the desire that ybu have shown to work with lis on this item and I •
-look forward to resolving, the dangerous crossing at 10200 South. As you
recorrimended, we have completed the additional signage and warnings at-the . ^
crossing to temporarily help the situation.
•;':/•.
•
• •£^-^{r'{y
•;\i'

Please contact me if there is addition information that you need or if you would
like a progress report on our public hearings and planning for the area., :-•
Sincerely, ' .-

• Tony Murphy
City Administrator
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AGENDA
Review the 1994 Projects.
1994 Projects
A.

AAR 254630W, RRP-LC35(84), 9th South 650 West
in Salt Lake City.
Will install the Constant Warning Device on
August 14, 1995.

B.

AAR 254773U, RRP-STP-LC35(92), 4800 South 180
West in Murray.
SPTC reported they are waiting for the control
panel. It will be here in a few weeks and
should be installed in late September, 1995.
What is the current status.

C.

AAR 254900T, STP-LC49 (15) , 6400 North 5000
West in Am-Fk.
SPTC has been authorized to proceed with the
construction of the crossing. SPTC reported
the material has been ordered.
What is the current Status.

D

AAR 254905C, RRP-STP-LC49(14) / 4th South East
of SR-114, near Orem.

The crossing material and signal
equipment was installed on May 17,
1995.
A
Final
inspection was
scheduled for August 8, 1995.
What is the current status.
*
Review the list of proposed projects scheduled for 1995
and 1997.
1995 Design Projects
A.

AAR 254340N, STP-007K )2, T2300 South 500
West on Draper Road in Riverton.
Plans were sent to SPTC authorizing them to '
proceed with the preparation of their plans
and estimate. SPTC reported the plans and
estimate will be sent to UDOT in Two
weeks(August 18, 1995).
What is the current status.
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AAR 254344R, STP-LC35(76),
West in South Jordan.

10200 South 300

The I-15/Railroad Study is complete- An
overpass will be placed at 106th South. When
the new railroad Grade and the 106th South
overpass is complete, an AT-Grade Crossing
will be placed at about 104th or 105th south
and the 10200 South crossing will be Closed.
Until then, this project is on hold.
Any update on the status of the project.
AAR 254347L, STP-0209(8)7, 90th South 1-15.
A Surveillance Review was held on May 11,
1993. Since that time an I-15/Railroad Study
has been completed. The I-15/Railroad Study
has determined a railroad underpass will be
constructed at 90th South to replace the AtGrade Crossing.
A supplemental surveillance was held at the
90th South At-Grade Crossing because there
have been a number of crashes that have
resulted in a death and a number of injuries.
The accidents are being caused from traffic
backing up at the Traffic Signals to the east
and west of the crossing and motorists are
being trapped on the crossing with no way to
get off the tracks. It was decided to do an
interim project and preempt the traffic
signals so the tracks can be cleared before
the trains come. SPTC has submitted the design
for the Preemption system. The agreement is
complete and the "Notice of Intended Action
has been advertised.
What is the current status.
AAR 254742V, STP-LC49 ( ), 5400 South 1700 East
in Springville.
A Surveillance Review was held on
May 10, 1993. A Surveillance Report
was issued on June 27, 1993. No
further action will be taken at this
time. Any change in stattfs.
AAR 254760T, STP-LC49 ( ), 5400 South 1600 East
in Springville.
A Surveillance Review was held on May 10,
1993. A Surveillance Report was issued on June
27, 1993. No other action required at this
time.
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be:

Clair L. Hendrickson, FHWA
Orlando Miera, Field Engineer, SPTC
Michael V. Arambula, Roadway Design
Gerald Bartschi, Roadway Design
Bob Charlesworth, Region 2
Lillian Witkowski, Safety
Steve Reitz, Internal Audit

October 18, 1995

Mr, Bob N. Price, Manager Public Services
Southern Pacific Transportation Company
1200 Corporate Center Drive
Monterey Park, California 91754-7605
SUBJECT:

November 16, 1995 Coordinating Meeting

Dear Bob:
The next meeting between the Utah Department of Transportation
and the South Pacific Transportation Company is scheduled for
November 16, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. in the UDOT*Complex in the 4th Floor
Roadway Design Conference Room, at 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
Attached is a copy of the Agenda and Railroad Status Report
for the next meeting to be held on November 16, 1995. We look
forward to meeting with you.
Sincerely yours,
James C. Nelson, P. E.
Engineering Coordinator,
Utilities and Railroads

J:\WPFILES\RRCMTG\D&RGW\111695
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October 18, 1995

Mr, Bob N. Price, Manager Public Services
Southern Pacific Transportation Company
1200 Corporate Center Drive
Monterey Park, California 91754-760.5
SUBJECT:

November 16, 1995 Coordinating Meeting

Dear Bob:
The next meeting between the Utah Department of Transportation
and the South Pacific Transportation Company is scheduled for
November 16, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. in the UDOT Complex in the 4th Floor
Roadway Design Conference Room, at 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
Attached is a copy of the Agenda and Railroad Status Report
for the next meeting to be held on November 16, 1995. We look
forward to meeting with you.
Sincerely yours,
James C. Nelson, P. E.
Engineering Coordinator,
Utilities and Railroads
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